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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION
Is There a Higher-Order Mechanism that Explains Performance Across Prediction Tasks?
by
Michelle L. Eisenberg
Doctor of Philosophy in Psychological and Brain Sciences
Washington University in St. Louis
Professor Jeffrey Zacks, Chair
Professor Thomas Rodebaugh, Co-Chair
People constantly make predictions about what will happen in the near future. People anticipate
how other people around them will act, what other people will say, and what actions will help
them achieve the greatest rewards. Because all of these behaviors are typically called prediction,
it is easy to make the assumption that performance across all of these types of tasks is driven by
the same underlying mechanism. However, there has been little investigation into whether the
mechanisms underlying prediction are the same across multiple task modalities. Therefore, in the
current study, 226 participants completed four types of tasks that putatively involve prediction to
determine whether there is a common factor that can account for performance on these tasks.
Fluid and crystallized intelligence were also assessed to ensure that general intelligence did not
drive correlations among the tasks. Preliminary evidence from a recent study suggested that
people with Posttraumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) have difficulty with predicting future activity;
therefore, participants also completed a questionnaire screening for symptoms of PTSD.
Performance across the four prediction tasks was not correlated, and PTSD severity was not
significantly correlated with any of the tasks in the study. These results suggest that there is not
an integrative prediction mechanism in the brain, but rather that there are multiple prediction

vii

systems operating in parallel within the brain. In addition, these results suggest that PTSD may
only be associated with a subset, if any, of prediction tasks. Future researchers studying
prediction must be careful to investigate performance on various prediction tasks separately,
rather than assuming that prediction performance is stable across tasks.

viii

Chapter 1: Introduction
The ability to anticipate what is going to happen in the near future is necessary for the
survival of all animals. Prey animals must make predictions about the locations of their predators
in order to avoid being eaten. Predators must anticipate the location of their prey so as not to
starve. Humans, too, must constantly make predictions on timescales ranging from a fraction of a
second to minutes, hours, and even days.
But, are all forms of prediction the same? In other words, do the same mechanisms that
allow people to anticipate the next word in a sentence also allow people to predict the next action
of the person in front of them, or whether it is likely to rain later in the day? For the past few
decades, researchers have studied the neural basis of prediction to investigate how people and
animals anticipate future input (e.g., Hikosaka, Sakamoto, & Usui, 1989; Rao & Ballard, 1999;
Tanaka et al., 2004; Dikker & Pylkkänen, 2013). However, there has been little work examining
whether the mechanisms underlying prediction are the same across multiple task modalities (see
Adams, Friston, and Bastos (2015) for some evidence of a ubiquitous prediction system). The
current study therefore examined four types of tasks that putatively involve prediction to
determine whether there is a common factor of prediction ability that accounts for performance
on these tasks. If a common mechanism for prediction exists, clinical populations with deficits in
one domain of prediction would be expected to display similar deficits across other prediction
tasks. Previous research on Posttraumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) has found that people with
higher levels of PTSD symptoms display difficulty with prediction of future human activity
(Eisenberg, Zacks, Rodebaugh, & Flores, in prep). Therefore, this study also included a
screening measure for symptoms of PTSD to determine whether this prediction deficit would
generalize across all of the prediction tasks.
1

There is evidence that many areas of the brain are involved in making predictions, and the
predictive coding theory, an influential model of prediction mechanisms in the brain, suggests
that prediction occurs in a hierarchical process that is similar across the brain (Friston, 2005). In
this model, higher-order cortical areas use past experience to make predictions about future
inputs and send these predictions to lower-order areas, which compare actual input from the
environment to these predictions. When there is a mismatch between the actual input and the
predictions, the lower-order areas send prediction error signals back to the higher-order areas
(Friston, 2005). Much research provides evidence of hierarchical signaling from higher-order
brain areas to lower-order brain areas and vice versa, including findings on prediction
mechanisms in sensory areas (see Bendixen, SanMiguel, & Schröger, 2012, for a review), reward
processing areas (e.g., Schultz, Tremblay, & Hollerman, 1998; Tanaka, et al., 2004), and
language processing areas (Dikker & Pylkkänen, 2013; Fruchter, Linzen, Westerlund, &
Marantz, 2015). Although Friston’s (2005) model does not require a single system for making
predictions, Adams, Friston, and Bastos (2015) provide evidence that the neural circuitry for
driving predictions is very similar across systems. They suggest that the individual systems
should not be considered separate, but “instead as a single active inference machine that tries to
predict its sensory input in all domains” (p. 100).
Other theories of information processing also posit the existence of a single integrative
system that combines sensory information across modalities to generate predictions. For
example, Event Segmentation Theory (EST; Zacks, Speer, Swallow, Braver, & Reynolds, 2007)
suggests that people create representations of the current environment, called event models,
based on incoming sensory information from various sensory modalities and semantic
knowledge. Predictions about the near future are then formed on the basis of these event models,
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and when errors in these predictions arise, the event model is reset to better represent the actual
state of the world. Research using narrative texts (e.g., Zacks, Speer, & Reynolds, 2009), simple
moving stimuli (e.g., Zacks, 2004), and complex activities (e.g., Zacks, Kurby, Eisenberg, &
Haroutunian, 2011) has provided support for this model, suggesting that an event model may be
one way of describing a higher-order integrative system that allows for predictions across
modalities.
On the other hand, it is possible that rather than relying on an integrative prediction
mechanism, each brain system uses a separate prediction mechanism that operates using only the
information present in each brain system. For example, the visual system might have a prediction
mechanism that operates using only visual information from the world and previous visual
experience. As mentioned above, the predictive coding theory does not require an integrative
prediction system, as Friston (2005) primarily argues that predictions operate in a hierarchical
fashion within each brain system. Therefore, it is possible that multimodal stimuli (e.g., visual
scenes that also involves music and speaking) activate multiple brain systems in concert,
resulting in the illusion of integration without involving an integratory prediction mechanism.
Because there is little research attempting to differentiate between an integratory prediction
mechanism versus separate prediction mechanisms within each brain system, the current study
represents an initial step toward determining whether such an integratory prediction mechanism
actually exists.
Previous research and theorizing on prediction, including research on the predictive coding
theory and EST, are based, in part, in a large literature on the neural mechanisms involved in
creating and maintaining predictions in the brain. As might be expected, an examination of this
literature provides evidence both for and against a higher-order prediction mechanism that
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integrates information across modalities. In particular, research on the neural mechanisms
involved in creating and maintaining predictions in the sensory systems, reward processing
systems, and language processing systems provides evidence both for and against such an
integrative mechanism. In addition, error signaling from lower-order areas to higher-order areas
is essential in models of a predictive brain, and research findings on error signaling also suggest
evidence supporting and opposing a common prediction mechanism. Therefore, each of these
topics is discussed in detail in this introduction, followed by a description of the tasks used in the
current study.
1.1 Prediction Formation
According to the predictive coding model (e.g., Friston, 2005), prediction formation
should occur within both lower-order and higher-order systems, with the higher-order systems
capable of integrating information across modalities to form adaptive predictions about future
input and then communicating these predictions to lower-order areas. Therefore, in this section,
specific attention is given to evidence that higher-order areas are involved in the prediction
process across modalities.
1.1.1

Sensory Systems

Within the sensory systems, the main focus of research has been on auditory and visual
prediction mechanisms. One method of studying prediction formation in the auditory systems is
to investigate the effects of repeating an auditory tone or a pattern of auditory tones a varying
number of times, as predictions would be expected to increase in strength as the number of
repetitions increases. Haenschel, Vernon, Dwivedi, Gruzelier, & Baldewag (2005), for example,
investigated event related potentials (ERPs) while participants listened to series of tones that
were presented 2, 6, or 36 times. They found a positivity that began 50 to 250 ms after a tone
4

was presented and that increased in strength as the number of repetitions increased, and they
suggested that this repetition positivity is associated with the formation of a sensory memory
representation of the repeated tone. Bendixen, SanMiguel, and Schröger (2012) took this finding
a step farther and suggested that the sensory memory representation is used to predict future
tones. They interpreted the repetition positivity as the signal that occurs when a predicted
stimulus matches the actual stimulus.
To further determine how the brain represents expectations of future stimuli, Raij,
McEvoy, Mäkelä, and Hari (1997) investigated the brain response to omitted tones. They used
magnetoencephalography (MEG) while participants listened to repeated tones. Seven percent of
these tones were randomly omitted, and the authors found bilateral activation in the auditory
cortex, particularly the supratemporal cortex, when the tones were omitted. They argued that this
activation represents the buildup of an expectation of the tone and a signal indicating that this
expectation was not fulfilled. Mustovic et al. (2003) conducted a similar study using functional
magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI). They had subjects listen to repeated patterns of sounds and
interspersed a short period of deviant louder sound or a short period of silence into the pattern.
Increased activity in the bilateral posterior secondary and association auditory cortices, right
Heschl’s gyrus, and right planum temporale occurred during both types of deviant periods. In
addition, greater activity during the silent period than the louder period was seen in the right
planum temporale and part of the right temporoparietal junction, suggesting that these regions
are involved in retrieving auditory memory traces for predicted (but absent) stimuli.
Research on the visual system has found similar prediction mechanisms in the visual
cortex. For example, Luft, Meeson, Welchman, & Kourtzi (2015) used fMRI and multi-voxel
pattern analysis to examine predictions in primary visual cortex. They had participants view a
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sequence of gratings with different orientations. After participants learned the sequence, they
were able to detect patterns of activation in the primary visual cortex representing the
participants’ predictions of the orientation of the next grating, providing evidence that the
primary visual cortex maintains predictions about future visual stimuli. In another study using
multi-voxel pattern analysis, participants viewed gratings with different orientations and heard
auditory cues that provided information about the orientation of the next grating stimulus (Kok,
Jehee, & Lange, 2012). The authors found that top down expectations driven by the auditory cue
sharpened the representation of the predicted orientation in early visual cortex. Specifically, they
found that expectation of a particular orientation dampened the overall response of the early
visual cortex to the stimulus while simultaneously making it easier for the classifier to predict the
behavioral response of the participant. These results suggest that higher-order cortical regions
send top-down predictive signals to early visual cortex that bias the response in that area and
facilitate performance on the task.
Trapp and Bar (2015) posited a model of top-down and bottom-up predictive processing
in the visual system, suggesting that the orbitofrontal cortex (OFC) is involved in creating
predictions that bias processing of visual stimuli based on context. Specifically, their model
suggests that early visual areas send information at a low spatial frequency to the OFC, which
uses that information and prior knowledge of the context to make predictions about the identity
of the most likely input. These predictions bias the analyses performed by the visual areas toward
the relevant options, which is consistent with predictive coding theory.
1.1.2

Reward Processing Systems

Predictions related to reward processing appear to be generated in the striatum, which
includes the caudate and putamen (see Schultz, Tremblay, & Hollerman, 1998, for a review). For
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example, populations of neurons in the caudate and putamen of behaving monkeys increase and
maintain their firing rate during a delay before an expected target appears and during a delay
before a reward is dispensed, suggesting that these neurons signal the expectation of a reward
(Hikosaka, Sakamoto, & Usui, 1989; Apicella, Scarnati, Ljungberg, & Schultz, 1992).
fMRI studies on reward prediction in humans have supported these animal findings.
Tanaka, et al. (2004), for example, found that when participants learned a task involving
immediate rewards, activity increased in the striatum, insula, and the lateral OFC, among other
areas. In addition, when participants needed to maintain a representation of the reward structure
in order to obtain future rewards, activity increased in the striatum, insula, ventrolateral PFC, the
dorsolateral PFC, and other areas. In another fMRI study, activity in the striatum increased when
participants saw cues that predicted rewards compared to when they saw cues that did not predict
rewards (Ramnani, Elliott, Athwal, & Passingham, 2004). Providing further support for the
involvement of the striatum in prediction, Ernst et al. (2004) found activation in the ventral
striatum during the period right before participants received a reward. They also found activity in
the left lateral and medial OFC and left insula (among other areas) during this period of reward
anticipation. On the other hand, a meta-analysis of 142 studies of reward processing found that
the bilateral insula, anterior cingulate cortex, inferior parietal lobule, and brain stem displayed
activation related to anticipation of rewards, whereas the ventral striatum, medial OFC, and
amygdala displayed increased activation during reward outcome stages (Liu, Hairston, Schrier,
& Fan, 2011).
Although the lower-order brain areas found to be involved in reward prediction tasks are
different than those involved in visual and auditory prediction tasks, the tasks are similar in that
higher-order brain areas are recruited during the performance of all of the tasks. These findings
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again provide support for Friston’s predictive coding theory and suggest that higher-order areas
may be necessary for integration of predictive information across modalities.
1.1.3

Language Processing System

The neural basis for prediction formation in the language processing systems has also
received much attention. For example, Dikker & Pylkkänen (2013) used MEG while participants
viewed pictures that were either strongly predictive or weakly predictive. After viewing each
picture, participants saw a word that either matched or did not match the prediction generated by
the picture and indicated whether the word was a match or a mismatch for the preceding picture.
For example, in a predictive trial, participants might see a picture of an apple followed by the
word “apple,” whereas in a weakly predictive trial, participants might see a picture of a grocery
bag (which could represent any type of edible object) followed by the word “apple.” During the
predictive trials compared to the weakly predictive trials, they found increased activity in the
mid-temporal cortex and the ventromedial PFC around 350 ms before the onset of the noun and
increased activity in the occipital lobe right before the noun was presented. The authors
suggested that these results represent a predictive feedback process from higher- to lower-order
cortical regions. Specifically, they posited that the activity in the visual cortex right before the
noun was presented represented the preactivation of features associated with the predicted noun,
that the activity in the mid-temporal cortex represented the preactivation of the predicted lexical
representation of the noun, and that the activity in the ventromedial PFC represented the
combination of lexical and semantic representations into a prediction of the future input. They
further argued that the activation in the visual cortex corresponded to top-down activation of
relevant features and the suppression of irrelevant features in response to the previously
presented image.
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Fruchter, Linzen, Westerlund, and Marantz (2015) found similar results when participants
read adjective-noun phrases. They found increased activity in the left middle temproral gyrus
during the time after the presentation of predictive compared to unpredictive adjectives but
before the noun was presented. In addition, they found decreased activity in the left middle
temporal gyrus when predictable nouns were presented, suggesting that activity in this area
decreased once predictions were fulfilled. The results of these studies again suggest a
hierarchical prediction system in which higher-order areas form predictions and then
communicate these predictions to other areas of the brain.
1.2 Human Electroencephalographic Studies of Prediction Error
At the same time as the higher-order brain areas form predictions and communicate these
predictions to lower-order areas, the lower-order areas must send signals to the higher-order
areas when these predictions are incorrect. Most studies on prediction error in humans have used
electroencephalography (EEG) to study event related potentials in the brain, as prediction error
signals in the brain emerge very quickly and EEG is capable of measuring these signals as they
occur. The most commonly reported error signals are the error related negativity (ERN),
mismatch negativity (MMN), P300, N400, and P600. Although most of these error signals are
elicited by stimuli in multiple sensory modalities, suggesting a common eliciting mechanism, the
existence of multiple error signals suggests that different mechanisms may drive the detection of
error. Findings related to these error signals are therefore informative for determining whether
there is a higher order prediction mechanism that integrates information across modalities.
1.2.1

Error Related Negativity (ERN)

The ERN was first reported in two studies that presented a series of stimuli either visually or
auditorily. When participants made an error in their response, a negativity with a fronto-central
9

maximum was observed 0 to 100 ms after the error (Falkenstein, Hohnsbein, Hoormann, &
Blanke, 1991; Gehring, Goss, Coles, Meyer, & Donchin, 1993). Since then, the ERN has been
the subject of numerous studies and has been found in tasks of various difficulty levels and
response modalities (for a review, see Weinberg, Dieterich, & Riesel, 2015). In particular, the
ERN has been implicated in studies of reward processing (e.g., Holroyd, Nieuwenhuis, Yeung, &
Cohen, 2003), and there is strong evidence that the ERN is generated by the anterior cingulate
cortex (ACC; e.g., Gehring, Goss, Coles, Meyer, & Donchin, 1993; Dehaene, Posner, & Tucker,
1994; Ullsperger & von Cramon, 2001), which is thought to integrate pain/punishment and
gain/reward to drive behavior (Weinberg, Dieterich, & Riesel, 2015). The ACC is thought to
integrate signals from multiple sensory systems, and it has dense connections to the prefrontal
cortex and the midbrain dopamine system, suggesting that error signals from the dopamine
system in response to a reward or loss may be sent to the ACC and then to the prefrontal cortex
for further processing (for a review, see Weinberg, Dieterich, & Riesel, 2015).
1.2.2

Mismatch Negativity (MMN)

The mismatch negativity (MMN) signal has repeatedly been found in auditory tasks in
which rare sounds are inserted into a sequence of repeated sounds. In these tasks, the MMN
signal begins around 100-250 ms after the rare deviant sound and is localized in the bilateral
auditory cortices and in the right frontal cortex (see Kujala, Tervaniemi, and Schröger, 2007, for
a review). The MMN has also been found in tasks involving much more complex patterns of
which participants are not consciously aware, such as a rule that short tones must be followed by
low tones and long tones by high tones (Paavilainen, Arajärvi, & Takegata, 2007). There is some
evidence that the MMN begins in the bilateral auditory cortices and later is generated by the right
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frontal cortex (Rinne, Alho, Ilmoniemi, Virtanen, & Näätänen, 2000), suggesting that the error
signal may be sent from lower- to higher-order brain areas.
The MMN also has been elicited in tasks involving other modalities, including visual
processing. For example, Tales, Newton, Troscianko, and Butler (1999) presented a series of
visual stimuli in the peripheral visual field and interspersed rare deviant stimuli. They found that
the deviant stimuli elicited a negativity that began 250-400 ms after the stimulus and that
appeared to be generated by supplemental visual areas in the occipital lobe and posterior
temporal cortex. They suggested that this negativity is similar to the MMN found in response to
deviant tones in studies of auditory processing. Czigler, Balázs, and Pató (2004) found a similar
negativity that began 140-200 ms after the presentation of a deviant visual stimulus. Providing
further support that this signal is analogous to the auditory MMN, Wei, Chan, and Luo (2002)
used tasks that required both visual and auditory processing. Participants viewed a series of
repeated and rare deviant stimuli while at the same time listening to a series of repeated and
deviant auditory stimuli. In the first block of the task, the participants were instructed to attend to
the visual stimuli, and in the second block, they were instructed to attend to the auditory stimuli.
They found a negativity beginning 100-200 ms after the deviant stimuli regardless of modality.
When participants attended to the auditory stimuli, the negativity was greatest in the temporal
lobe, whereas when participants attended to the visual stimuli, the negativity was greatest in the
occipital lobe. Furthermore, 200-250 ms after deviant visual and auditory stimuli, a negativity
was observed in frontal regions, suggesting the presence of a feed-forward error signal that
integrated the error signals from both modalities.

11

1.2.3

P300

The P300 is another signal that is often elicited in tasks involving unpredictable or
surprising auditory or visual stimuli (for a review, see Polich, 2007). For example, Pollich and
Margala (1997) presented participants with a series of repeated and deviant auditory stimuli and
found a positivity approximately 300 ms after the presentation of the deviant stimuli. They found
the same positivity when rare target tones were presented within periods of silence. A very
similar response has been observed in tasks involving repeated and rare deviant visual stimuli
(e.g., Bledowski et al., 2004; Bledowski, Prvulovic, Goebel, Zanella, & Linden, 2004). Although
there is not a strong consensus about the neural origins of the P300, lesion studies suggest that
frontal lobe and temporal-parietal junction integrity are necessary for the generation of the P300,
suggesting that these areas are likely candidates (Pollich, 2007).
The P300 is actually thought to consist of two distinct signals: the P3a and the P3b. The
P3a is typically observed when participants passively listen to infrequent tones or view visual
stimuli that are embedded within a series of repeated stimuli, whereas the P3b is elicited when
participants must overtly respond to infrequent stimuli that are presented within a series of
repeated stimuli (for a review, see Pollich, 2007). Pollich (2012) suggests that the P3a is driven
by attentional processing of novel or unexpected stimuli in the frontal lobe and that the P3b is
generated when memory storage in temporal-parietal areas is accessed in the service of
performing a discrimination task. This suggests that the P3a may signal the presence of an error
in prediction and that, in response to that error, memory stores are accessed to allow for better
predictions on future trials, generating the P3b.
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1.2.4

N400

The N400 has been observed mainly in tasks involving language processing, particularly
tasks in which stimuli do not match the preceding context. It was first reported in a study in
which participants read sentences with either semantically congruent or incongruent final words
(Kutas & Hillyard, 1980). The authors found a negative deflection between 300-600 ms after
participants read the incongruent words, suggesting that the N400 represents a response to
semantic errors. Since then, the N400 has been observed in response to many types of
semantically incongruent stimuli, including to sentences that do not match the context of the
preceding paragraph (e.g., van Berkum, Brown, & Hagoort, 1999). In addition, van Berkum,
Brown, Zwisterlood, Kooijman, and Hagoort (2005) found an N400 in response to words that
were unlikely given the grammatical structure of the sentence. They had participants listen to
sentences in Dutch, which uses gendered suffixes on adjectives based on the gender of upcoming
nouns in noun phrases. The authors recorded event related potentials (ERPs) after a gendered
adjective was presented but before the associated noun was presented. Participants heard
sentences such as “The burglar had no trouble locating the secret family safe. Of course it was
situated behind a big, but unobtrusive painting.” In this sentence, the adjective “big” had a neuter
gender suffix, which was consistent with the gender of the word “painting.” On the other hand,
the sentence, “Of course, it was situated behind a big, but unobtrusive bookcase,” was
inconsistent because in this sentence the adjective “big” had an inconsistent gender when in the
same sentence as the word “bookcase.” The authors found a very large N400 response at the time
that the prediction-inconsistent nouns were presented. The authors suggested that this ERP
response meant that people predicted upcoming words based on the structure of current and
preceding sentences.
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The N400 has been localized to a source in the anterior medial temporal lobe, in middle and
superior temporal areas, inferior temporal areas, and prefrontal areas, including the dorsolateral
frontal cortex (for a review, see Kutas & Federmeier, 2011). Consistent with the predictive
coding theory, Kutas and Federmeier (2011) suggested that the N400 actually consists of a wave
of feed-back activity in response to an unexpected word: The activity begins in the left posterior
temporal gyrus at 250 ms after word presentation, then spreads to more forward and ventral areas
in the temporal lobe by 350 ms, and finally spreads to the right anterior temporal lobe and to the
bilateral frontal lobes by 370-500 ms.
1.2.5

P600

The P600 is similar to the N400, in that both have been studied mainly during language
processing; however, the P600 is observed when syntactic structure is violated, whereas the
N400 is observed when semantic context is unexpected (for a review, see Swaab, Ledoux,
Camblin, & Boudewyn, 2012). The P600 was first reported in a study in which participants read
sentences that either conformed to expected syntactic structure (e.g., “The broker planned to
conceal the transaction.”) or violated expected syntactic structure (e.g., “The broker persuaded to
buy the stock.”; Osterhout & Holcomb, 1993). The authors found a slow positive signal around
600 ms following the word “to” in the sentences that violated syntactic structure. The P600 has
also been observed for other types of syntactic violations, including gender and case marking
violations (e.g., Coulson, King, & Cutas, 1998) and verb tense violations (e.g., Osterhout &
Nicol, 1999). However, some recent research has led to questions about whether the P600 is
elicited only in response to syntactic violations, as it has also been observed in response to
certain types of semantic violations (for a review, see Swaab, Ledoux, Camblin, & Boudewyn,
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2012). Overall, the evidence suggests that the P600 represents a prediction error response to
stimuli that violate predictions about syntactic, and possibly semantic, structure.
There has not been much research attempting to localize the P600 to specific brain areas. In
one of the few studies discussing the neural generator of the P600, Service, Helenius, Maury, &
Salmelin, (2007) used MEG while participants read a series of sentences, some of which violated
syntactic rules and some of which violated semantic rules. They found evidence for both the
P600 and the N400, and they localized the P600 to the superior temporal cortex, posterior to the
generator of the N400 response. Brouwer and Hoeks (2013) disagreed with this finding, and used
existing evidence from neuroimaging studies of language processing to suggest that the P600
originates from the left inferior frontal gyrus. However, although they provided
recommendations for future studies meant to support their hypothesis, they did not collect any
data localizing the P600 to the inferior frontal gyrus. It is therefore difficult to determine whether
the neural mechanisms underlying the P600 conform to the predictions of predictive coding
theory.
1.3 Interim Summary
Evidence on prediction formation and prediction error signaling strongly suggests that
predictive processes occur throughout the brain, from lower-order sensory areas to higher-order
cortical areas that include the prefrontal cortex. However, the literature provides evidence both
for and against the hypothesis that there is a higher-order prediction mechanism that drives
performance across tasks. On one hand, there seem to be similar higher-order brain areas,
primarily in the frontal cortex, that are activated across tasks requiring prediction formation. In
addition, many of the error signals are elicited by stimuli in multiple modalities. For example, the
P300 is sensitive to both simple tone sequences and to complex semantics and the N400
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responds to sentence-level incongruity as well as situation-level incongruity. On the other hand,
the fact that different lower-order brain regions are activated during prediction formation
depending on the task and that there are so many different prediction error responses suggests
that there may not be a single integrative prediction mechanism. These two possibilities have
very different implications for individual differences in performance across prediction tasks. If
there is a higher-order integrative prediction mechanism that drives performance across tasks,
prediction performance across tasks should be highly correlated. Conversely, if predictions are
generated separately within each neural system, prediction performance across tasks might not
be highly correlated due to individual strengths and weaknesses within specific modalities.
Discriminating between these alternate possibilities requires the use of tasks that are likely
to require multiple modalities, as tasks that fall only within a specific modality might not require
a higher-order integrator. Fortunately, although prediction formation and error signaling are
often studied separately in different modalities, most real-world tasks do not involve single
modalities, and even the laboratory tasks discussed above rarely require only a single sensory
system. For example, the reward prediction literature often uses visual cues to signal upcoming
rewards (e.g., Ramnani, Elliott, Athwal, & Passingham, 2004; Ernst et al., 2004), which means
that prediction mechanisms in the visual system and the reward processing system must be active
at the same time. In fact, in the real world, it is common for people to employ the visual,
auditory, language, and reward processing systems simultaneously. This strongly suggests the
presence of a higher-order system that integrates information across modalities in order to make
adaptive predictions, and given the evidence discussed in the previous sections, this higher-order
system likely resides in the frontal cortex. However, there is not enough evidence to support the
delineation of specific areas within the frontal cortex as multimodal integrators and predictors.
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The tasks used in the current study were chosen because they require prediction across
multiple modalities and were therefore likely to involve a higher-order cortical prediction
system. Specifically, the current study used two types of predictive looking tasks, which use eye
tracking to determine whether participants are making predictions about future input, a
probabilistic classification task, in which participants use cues to predict which of two outcomes
will occur, and a gambling task, in which participants predict which choices will lead to the
highest rewards. I hypothesized that if a higher-order integrative prediction mechanism existed,
there would be high correlations across these tasks. On the other hand, I hypothesized that if
predictions were generated separately by modality specific brain systems, correlations across
these tasks would be low due to individual strengths and weaknesses in different modalities.
While there have not been any previous studies that have investigated whether
performance is correlated across the four tasks included in this study, it is informative to examine
previous research on the similarities and differences in the brain regions and systems activated
during performance of these tasks. The research literature on these tasks provides evidence both
for and against the hypothesized integrative prediction mechanism, and the following sections
therefore discuss prior research on each of these tasks, with an emphasis on the neural
mechanisms involved in their performance (where this literature exists).
1.4 Predictive Looking Tasks
There are two main types of predictive looking tasks: non-verbal predictive looking tasks
and language predictive looking tasks. In non-verbal predictive looking tasks, participants
complete short sequences of actions or watch short movies while their eyes are tracked using an
eye tracker. Researchers are typically interested in whether participants look at objects before
they are acted upon (e.g., how early participants look at a bowl before the actor picks it up), and
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these tasks require integration of visual and motor information to make predictions. In language
predictive looking tasks, participants typically view static images of objects while listening to
sentences, and researchers are interested in whether participants look at objects before they are
mentioned in the sentences. These tasks require auditory, visual, and language processing to
achieve accurate predictions.
1.4.1

Non-Verbal Predictive Looking Tasks

Non-verbal predictive looking has been studied in ages ranging from infants to adults. In one
study, six-, eight-, twelve-, fourteen-, and sixteen-month-old infants were shown short movies of
a person interacting with a common object (Hunnius & Bekkering, 2010). In these movies, the
objects were either brought to a correct or incorrect location. For example, in one movie a cup
was brought to a person’s mouth, while in another movie, a cup was brought to a person’s ear.
The authors found that infants were more likely to display anticipatory looking to the target
location when the object and target locations were congruent than when they were incongruent.
This study suggests that infants as young as six-months-old are capable of making predictions
about objects and object-related goals. Cannon and Woodward (2012) also studied predictive
looking in 11-month-old infants. They showed infants movies of a hand making repeated
reaching movements toward one of two objects. Then, the locations of the objects were switched.
Infants were more likely to predictively look at the original object rather than at the original
location, suggesting that they were predicting that the actor would continue interacting with the
same object rather than simply reacting to the actor’s motion. Falck-Ytter, Gredebäck, and von
Hofsten (2006) found similar results when they had 12-month-old infants watch a movie of an
actor placing three toys in a bucket. Infants displayed reliable predictive eye movements to the
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bucket before the toys contacted the bucket. These studies suggest that infants are capable of
making goal-directed predictions about future action.
Studies in adults have also examined goal-directed predictive looking while participants
carried out an action themselves. For example, Land, Mennie, and Rusted (1999) used eye
tracking while participants made tea. A head mounted video camera and a second video camera
located across the room were used to obtain fixation location. The authors found that participants
first fixated on an object an average of .56 seconds before touching the object and that
participants fixated the next object an average of .61 seconds before finishing their use of the
previous object. In a very similar study, participants made a sandwich while their gaze location
was tracked using an eye tracker. The authors found that 30% of the reaches to objects were
preceded by a fixation to that object within the previous eight seconds (Hayhoe, Shrivastava,
Mruczek, & Pelz, 2003). In another study, participants grasped a bar and moved it around an
obstacle toward a target. Participants looked at the grasp site on the bar and at the target before
making contact with the bar and the target. In addition, participants stopped fixating these objects
after contact was made (Johansson, Westling, Bäckström, & Flanagan, 2001).
Not only do adults engage in predictive looking when performing a task themselves, but
they also perform goal-directed predictive looking when watching someone else complete a task.
Flanagan and Johansson (2003) had participants both stack blocks themselves and watch an actor
stack the blocks in the same manner. The authors found that in both the passive and the active
trials, almost all fixations were directed to the sites of contact on the blocks and the locations
where the blocks were to be set down. In addition, in both types of trials, participants’ fixations
occurred an average of 150 ms before contact actually occurred. In another study, Elsner, FalckYtter, & Gredebäck (2012) created 12 s movies of point-light displays by attaching markers to a

19

hand moving laterally in space. They created two motion conditions: a biological motion
condition in which the hand moved naturally and a non-biological motion condition in which the
hand moved at a constant velocity. In both movies the hand moved toward and contacted a target
object that was partially occluded by a barrier. In a between-subjects design, participants
watched either the biological or the non-biological motion movies ten times while their eyes
were tracked using an eye tracker. The authors found that participants in the biological motion
condition looked at the target object an average of 124 ms before contact occurred. On the other
hand, participants in the non-biological motion condition looked at the target object an average
of 21.5 ms after contact occurred, which the authors stated constitutes reactive, rather than
predictive, looking. This study suggests that people are equipped to be able to predict future
biological motion, whereas people are less able to predict non-biological motion. From an
evolutionary perspective, this would make sense, as living organisms are much more likely to
move around on a regular basis that non-living objects.
Building on this literature, Eisenberg, Zacks, and Flores (in prep) developed a novel
paradigm, called the Predictive Looking at Action Task (PLAT) to assay predictive looking
while participants watch videos of actors performing everyday activities. Unlike the studies
discussed above that used short videos of an actor interacting with only one object, the PLAT
uses movies during which an actor interacts with many objects sequentially. In preliminary work,
twenty-five participants passively watched three five-to-six minute long videos of an actor
completing an everyday activity (e.g., making breakfast, preparing for a party). For each movie,
the points at which the actor came into contact with a new object were identified and 500 ms bins
were created for the three seconds before each point of contact. Both the proportion of
participants who looked at the target object and participants’ fixation time on the target object
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increased as time to contact approached (See Figure 1). These results suggest that the PLAT can
provide an online measure of prediction ability. This same pattern of results was replicated in
another study of twenty-eight participants. Additional analyses using these two data sets also
found that predictive looking decreased around event boundaries, suggesting that participants
formed event models while viewing these movies, and that they updated their event models when
predictions became more difficult (Eisenberg & Zacks, in preparation).

Figure 1. Results from Eisenberg, Zacks, and Flores (in prep) for the PLAT. The figure on the
left displays the proportion of participants who looked at the target object during each of the six
500 ms bins. The figure on the right displays the amount of time participants looked at the target
object during each of the six bins. For both figures, the time bins progress in time from left to
right from 3000-2500 ms before the actor contacted the target object to 500-0 ms before the actor
contacted the target object

1.4.2

Language Predictive Looking Tasks

Language-related predictive looking tasks typically use the visual world paradigm to
investigate anticipatory language processing in adults. In the visual world paradigm, participants
view an array of objects on a computer screen while listening to a sentence. An eye tracker is
used to determine the point at which participants begin looking at the next object to be
mentioned in the sentence. In one of the earliest studies investigating anticipatory eye
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movements while participants looked at an array of images, Altmann and Kamide (1999) had
participants listen to sentences such as “The boy will move the cake” or “The boy will eat the
cake” while viewing a collection of images that, in this example, included depictions of a boy, a
cake, and various toys. In one version of each sentence, the verb could only apply to one of the
images (in this example, only the cake could be eaten), and in the other version, the verb could
apply to all of the objects (in this example, all of the objects could be moved). The authors found
that participants began looking at the cake much earlier when the sentence included the word
“eat” than when the sentence included the word “move.” In a similar study, Kamide, Altmann,
and Haywood (2003) had participants listen to sentences such as “The woman will spread the
butter on the bread.” The authors found that participants looked at the goal object (the bread, in
this case), immediately after they heard the referring expression (spread the butter). In another
study, Altmann and Kamide (2007) used a similar paradigm but varied the tense of the verbs in
the sentences. For example, participants heard sentences such as, “the man will drink” or “the
man has drunk” while viewing a screen with both a full glass of beer and an empty wine glass.
Participants looked more often at the object that matched the tense of the verb in the sentence,
even before the target object was mentioned. These studies suggest that people engage in
predictive looking during language processing as well as when they view short movie clips of
human actions.
1.5 Probabilistic Classification Tasks
In probabilistic classification tasks, participants are asked to classify stimuli into two or
more categories. Participants usually receive feedback after each trial, allowing them to learn to
predict the category of subsequent items. Although these tasks are typically used to measure
executive control, rather than prediction ability, these tasks require participants to learn
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information over a series of trials and use this information to make subsequent predictions. There
are a variety of probabilistic classification tasks that require participants to use previously
learned information to respond on subsequent trials, including the weather prediction task and
the Mr. Potato Head task.
In the weather prediction task (Knowlton, Squire, & Gluck, 1994), participants see
various combinations of four cards with simple geometric designs and are asked to predict, on
the basis of these cards, whether there will be rain or sun. The four cards are associated with
75%, 57%, 43%, or 25% probability with one of the outcomes. Participants receive feedback
after each trial. Using this task, Knowlton, Squire, and Gluck (1994) found that after 50 trials,
healthy participants performed above chance, choosing the optimal answer on an average of
68.2% of the trials. After 350 trials, healthy participants chose the optimal answer on an average
of 74% of the trials. Gluck, Shohamy, and Myers (2002) found similar results, finding that after
200 trials, participants chose the optimal answer on an average of over 70% of the trials.
In a very similar paradigm, Shohamy et al. (2004) created probabilistically predictive
stimuli using a Mr. Potato Head doll. In this study, four features of the Mr. Potato Head doll
could vary, and participants had to use this information to predict whether each Mr. Potato Head
customer at an ice cream shop wanted vanilla or chocolate ice cream. They found that healthy
adult participants made optimal predictions on approximately 80% of the trials, which is
consistent with findings from the weather prediction task. Aron et al. (2004) found almost
identical results in another sample of participants using the same Mr. Potato Head task, with
participants making optimal predictions on an average of approximately 70-80% of trials.
In addition to this behavioral replication, Aron et al. (2004) used fMRI to determine the
brain areas involved in making these predictions. Specifically, they broke the trials down into
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three phases: stimulus, delay, and feedback. Of these phases, activation during the delay was
most relevant to prediction, as it was during this time that participants most likely made their
predictions about ice cream flavor. The authors found significant activation in the right inferior
frontal cortex, caudate nucleus, parietal cortex, and cerebellum during this delay. In addition,
they found significant deactivation in the medial prefrontal cortex, medial temporal cortex, and
parietal cortex. The authors then correlated neural activity with the degree of uncertainty on each
trial. They found a significant positive correlation between activity in a region of interest in the
midbrain (centered on the substantia nigra) and increasing uncertainty during the delay period.
The authors therefore suggested that this midbrain region codes for uncertainty when people
make predictions. Finally, the authors examined the functional connectivity of this midbrain
region with the rest of the brain, and found significant correlations between activity in this region
and ventral striatum, orbitofrontal cortex, and dorsomedial frontal cortex, suggesting that feedforward and feed-back connections drive performance on this task.
In another type of probabilistic classification task, participants viewed a series of eight
rapidly presented circles and triangles. Participants then predicted whether the next stimulus was
likely to be a circle or a triangle. The amount of uncertainty on each trial varied depending on
how many circles and triangles were presented during the stimulus presentation phase. For
example, if all of the stimuli were circles, there was an 80% probability that the next stimulus
would be a circle as well. On the other hand, when there was an equal number of each type of
stimulus presented during the stimulus presentation phase, there was a 50% probability that the
next stimulus would be a circle. The authors found that even though participants were never told
about these different probabilities, participants quickly began to use the probabilities to help
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them make their predictions; as uncertainty decreased, participants made more confident and
correct decisions (Huettel, Song, & McCarthy, 2005).
In the same study, Huettel, Song, and McCarthy (2005) used fMRI to examine the brain
regions activated while participants performed this task. They found that bilateral insula, inferior
frontal gyrus, and intraparietal sulcus, along with right thalamus, and right inferior parietal lobule
displayed a significant increase in activation as uncertainty increased. In addition, the authors
analyzed the data to determine whether the order in which stimuli were presented affected the
neural response. They found that when a stimulus that was incongruent with the preceding
stimuli was presented late in a trial, the posterior parietal cortex, specifically, the intraparietal
sulcus, displayed significantly greater activation compared to trials in which an incongruent
stimulus was presented early in the trial. The authors suggested that the activation in this region
represents the neural correlates of the attempted resolution of uncertainty and, therefore, the
formation of a prediction about the target stimulus. In addition, based on previous research, the
authors suggested that while activity in the posterior parietal cortex reflects uncertainty about
which behavior to choose and the ultimate resolution of this uncertainty, the activity they
observed in the anterior insula is likely related to uncertainty about future reward outcomes.
1.6 Gambling Tasks
In the Iowa gambling task, participants are shown four decks of cards, are given a starting
amount of money, and are told to choose cards such that they make the most money and lose the
least money. When participants choose to turn over a card from the A or B decks, they usually
earn $100. When they choose to turn over a card from the C or D decks, participants usually earn
$50. However, every once in a while, turning over a card results in a penalty, with a larger
penalty associated with the A and B decks. This penalty occurs randomly, meaning that
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participants have no way of knowing when they will incur this penalty. Because of the high
penalties associated with the A and B decks, choosing cards from decks C and D results in the
higher scores on this task. In the first study using this task, Bechara, Damasio, Tranel, and
Damasio (1997) measured participants’ skin conductance (SCR) while they completed this task.
The authors found that healthy participants began choosing more cards from decks C and D and
began showing a higher SCR when choosing a card from decks A and B between the 10th-50th
cards, despite being unable to verbalize whether one deck was better than the other. This pattern
became very strong during trials 50-80, when participants began to express the possibility that
decks C and D were better and continued to show a high SCR when choosing cards from decks C
and D. During the last 20 trials, the pattern of choices remained relatively unchanged, but most
participants were confident that decks C and D resulted in the most advantageous outcome.
During this final phase, SCR remained high for decks A and B but became lower for decks C and
D, suggesting that participants no longer experienced as much concern when choosing cards
from decks C and D. The results of this study suggest that participants begin making predictions
about which deck will result in less monetary loss, even before they become consciously aware
of these predictions.
There have been multiple fMRI studies examining neural activity while participants
perform the Iowa gambling task. In the first fMRI study of this task, Fukui, Murai, Fukuyama,
Hayashi, and Hanakawa (2005) examined the selection period during which participants made
their choice about which deck to choose. The behavioral results replicated those of Bechara et al.
(1997), demonstrating that participants began preferentially choosing cards from the
advantageous decks beginning around trial 40 of 100. In addition, they found significant
activation in the medial prefrontal cortex when participants chose cards from the risky decks
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compared to the safe decks. Furthermore, the more successful participants were on the task, the
greater the activity in this same region. The authors suggest that when deciding which deck to
choose, participants create an estimate of the probability of gain versus loss, and that it is this
prediction that is represented in the activity in the medial prefrontal cortex.
Lawrence, Jollant, O’Daly, Zelaya, and Phillips (2009) found similar results in their
fMRI study of seventeen men who completed a similar version of the Iowa gambling task. They
again replicated the original Bechara et al. (1997) behavioral results. In addition, they compared
brain activity during the selection period compared to activity in a control task in which
participants were told which choices to make, and they found significant increased activation in
the medial orbito-frontal cortex and the ventral anterior cingulate cortex. Furthermore, when they
compared activation during the selection period on trials in which participants chose the risky
decks compared to trials when participants chose the safe decks, they found increased activation
during risky decisions in the medial frontal gyrus, lateral orbitofrontal cortex, insula, and the
occipital cortex. Providing further support for these results, another fMRI study found a
correlation between expected gain and activation in the hippocampus, superior frontal gyrus,
right medial frontal gyrus, inferior frontal gyrus, inferior orbito-frontal cortex, right amygdala,
insula, and orbito-frontal/ventromedial prefrontal cortex (Li, Lu, D’Argembeau, Ng, and
Bechara, 2010). The authors suggest that the amygdala sends a signal to the orbitofrontal/ventromedial prefrontal cortex when the potential for risk is present, and that the orbitofrontal/ventromedial prefrontal cortex then allows for conscious processing of the risk and
resulting decision. Although the authors do not explicitly mention prediction when discussing
these results, it seems likely that the activity in the orbito-frontal/ventromedial prefrontal cortex
reflects predictions about gains and losses occurring during the decision making process.
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In sum, non-verbal predictive looking tasks, language predictive looking tasks,
probabilistic classification tasks, and gambling tasks all require the use of prior information to
make predictions about future input. In addition, although they depend primarily on different
sensory modalities, they all overlap in their use of visual processing. On the other hand, there are
some clear differences between the tasks. Both predictive looking tasks use information stored
primarily in semantic memory, whereas the probabilistic classification and gambling tasks rely
on working and short-term memory to make predictions. In addition, the measurement tools
differ across the tasks, with performance on the predictive looking tasks measured using
oculomotor data and performance on the probabilistic classification and gambling tasks
measured using accuracy data. The tasks also have similarities and differences at the neural level.
Although there are little EEG or imaging data available for the predictive looking tasks, the
literature discussed earlier on predictions in the visual and language processing systems suggest
that these tasks likely involve feed-back and feed-forward signals between lower-order areas and
the frontal lobe. Similarly, imaging data for the probabilistic classification and gambling tasks
suggest that information related to prediction is activated in the lower-order and higher-order
brain areas, again suggesting the presence of feed-back and feed-forward connections. The
behavioral and neural similarities between these tasks suggest that similar mechanisms may
support performance on all of these tasks and that these tasks may load onto a single factor that
represents overall prediction ability.
To test whether performance on these types of tasks involves a higher-order integrative
prediction system, the current study included the PLAT, the visual world paradigm, the weather
prediction task, and the Iowa gambling task. The visual world, weather prediction, and Iowa
gambling tasks were chosen because all three have been the focus on extensive research. While
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the PLAT is a relatively new task, it was chosen because preliminary research found that it
reliably measured predictive looking during viewing of naturalistic movies and because eye
tracking may allow for a more sensitive measure of prediction than an overt behavioral response.
Surprisingly, there are extremely few studies that have previously investigated whether
performance is correlated across any combination of these types of tasks, and there have not been
any previous studies that have combined three or more of these tasks into a single study. The few
studies that have investigated performance on two of the tasks were both focused on performance
in clinical populations (HIV/AIDS and schizophrenia) and used only the Iowa gambling task and
the weather prediction task (Gonzalez, Wardle, Jacobus, Vassileva, & Martin-Thormeyer, 2010;
Wasserman, Barry, Bradford, Delva, & Beninger, 2012). Both studies found that performance
across these tasks was not as similar as expected, though neither study included a control group
of healthy participants. It is therefore not possible to determine from these previous studies
whether this lack of relationship between the two tasks would generalize to healthy populations.
In addition to completing these prediction tasks, participants also completed tasks
involving crystallized and fluid intelligence to ensure that similarities among these tasks were
not completely explained by other areas of cognitive functioning. The current study therefore
tested whether there was a unique factor that explained shared variance across the prediction
tasks, even when the fluid and crystallized intelligence tasks were included in the model.
In addition to furthering understanding of predictive processing, this study can inform
applied research with clinical populations. For example, people with Posttraumatic Stress
Disorder (PTSD) often experience hypervigilance and engage in constant surveillance of the
environment to prevent themselves from experiencing a reoccurrence of their traumatic event
(Ehlers & Clark, 2000); in other words, they make often erroneous predictions about potential
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dangers in their environment. To illustrate, a military veteran might anticipate the presence of
enemy soldiers around every corner, even though these predictions are incorrect. In addition,
research has found that people with PTSD display increased arousal not only in response to
threat-related information, but also in response to novel, demanding, or unpredictable cues
(Stam, 2007) and that people with PTSD have deficits on neutral attention tasks, primarily with
inhibiting responses to distracters (Vasterling, Brailey, Constans, & Sutker, 1998). In fact, in a
recent study in our laboratory, we found that people with PTSD made slower and less accurate
predictions about everyday activity compared to controls (Eisenberg, Zacks, Rodebaugh, &
Flores, in prep). Furthermore, imaging studies have found reduced activity in the dopamine
system in combat veterans (van Wingen et al., 2012), increased activity in the striatum in people
with PTSD (e.g., Linnman, Zeffiro, Pitman & Milad, 2011; Falconer et al., 2008), and increased
activity in the dorsal anterior cingulate cortex in people with PTSD (e.g., Shin & Liberzon,
2010). These studies suggest that feed-back and feed-forward signaling necessary for successful
predictions may be different in people with PTSD compared to people without PTSD. Because
these studies suggest that people with PTSD make incorrect predictions about future stimuli and
have difficulty inhibiting responses to distracters, I hypothesized that people with PTSD also
have difficulty on other tasks that require correct predictions. Therefore, the present study
screened participants for the presence of PTSD symptomology to determine whether people with
higher PTSD severity experience difficulty with a variety of tasks involving prediction.
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Chapter 2: Methods
2. 1 Participants
Two hundred seventy-six participants were recruited from the student participant pool at
Washington University. Fifty participants were dropped from analyses because they did not
complete both sessions of the study (26), the eye tracker could not track their eyes and no eye
tracking data was collected (14), they were not fluent in English (3), they did not follow task
instructions (4), or computer problems prevented them from completing the first session (3). An
additional 15 participants were dropped from only the visual world task analyses because these
participants were missing eye tracking data for more than 20% of the trials on this task but had
adequate data for the other tasks. This left data from 226 participants for all but the visual world
task and data from 211 participants for the visual world task. All analyses on single tasks and all
simple pairwise correlations that did not involve the visual world task included data from all 226
participants. All modeling was conducted with data only from the 211 participants with full data
sets. Participants ranged in age from 18 to 59 (mean = 19.73), and were 64% female. The study
took place over two sessions: a group testing session that lasted 1.5 hours and an individual eye
tracking session that lasted 1 hour.
2. 2 Eye-Tracking
An EyeLink 1000 eye tracker was used to collect oculometric measures. This eye tracker
records data at 1000 Hz. Gaze location was the measure of particular interest; however, we also
collected other oculometric measures including pupil size, fixation duration and saccade
distance. Participants were required to keep their head in the headrest throughout all of the tasks
requiring eye tracking. Nine-point calibration followed by validation of the resulting calibration
was used; however when nine-point calibration did not allow for adequate calibration, thirteen31

point calibration was used. If both nine-point and 13-point calibration failed, five-point
calibration was used. The infrared illuminator was initially set to 75% illumination; if calibration
failed at this illumination it was adjusted to either 50% illumination or 100% illumination
depending on which level of illumination provided the best calibration. After successful
calibration and validation, the experimenter used a simulated pupil of known size printed on an
index card to calibrate the pupil size measure, because the eye-tracker measures pupil size in
pixels rather than in millimeters. All eye-tracking tasks were presented on a 19-inch (74 cm)
monitor (1440x900 resolution, viewing distance of 58 cm from the forehead rest, viewing angle
of 38.6o) using the Experiment Builder software designed by S-R Research (http://www.srresearch.com) to be used with this eye tracker.
2.3 Procedure
Participants first completed the group session. During the group session, participants
reviewed the consent form and completed the demographics questionnaire. Participants were
then told to begin the tasks on the computer. All computer tasks were presented on 23-inch (58.4
cm) monitors, with a viewing distance of 68.5 cm. Each task began once the previous task was
complete, with no intervention from the experimenter. Participants began by completing the
weather prediction task and then the Iowa gambling task. They then completed the letter sets
task, followed by the synonym and antonym vocabulary tasks. Participants continued with the
paper folding task and then the Information task. They finished the group session by completing
the Raven’s Progressive Matrices task. During the individual eye tracking session, participants
completed the PLAT and then the visual world task. They then filled out the PTSD
questionnaires. They were given a debriefing form explaining the purpose of the study before
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they left this session. (See Table 1 for a list of the tasks participants completed in each session of
the study.)
Table 1. List of tasks within each session of the study.
Group Session
Demographics Questionnaire
Weather Prediction
Iowa Gambling
Letter Sets
Synonym
Antonym
Paper Folding
Information
Raven's Progressive Matrices
Individual Eye Tracking Session
Predictive Looking at Action
Visual World
PTSD Questionnaires

2.4 Measures
2.4.1

Demographics

Participants completed a short demographic questionnaire that included age, gender,
handedness, ethnicity, current employment, highest level of education, history of major medical
problems, and hours of exercise.
2.4.2

PTSD Questionnaires

Participants first completed the Life Events Checklist for DSM-5 (LEC-5; Weathers, Blake,
Schnurr, Kaloupek, Marx, & Keane, 2013), which included 17 questions about a variety of
potentially traumatic events and eight additional questions about the severity of the most severe
event. Participants then completed the PTSD Checklist for DSM-5 (PCL-5; Weathers, Litz,
Keane, Palmieri, P.A., Marx, & Schnurr, 2013), which consisted of 20 questions assessing the
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severity of all DSM-5 PTSD symptoms participants experienced over the past month. The
National Center for PTSD has proposed a cut-point of 33, at or above which someone would be
classified as having probable clinical PTSD, though they note that this could change after further
research (National Center for Posttraumatic Stress Disorder). The PCL-5 has strong internal
consistency (α = .94), test-retest reliability (r = .82), and convergent and divergent validity
(Blevins, Weathers, Davis, Witte, & Domino, 2015).
2.4.3

Crystallized and Fluid Intelligence Tasks

Participants completed three tasks testing crystallized intelligence and three tasks testing
fluid intelligence. The crystallized intelligence tasks included the Information Test (Wechsler,
2008) and the Synonym and Antonym Vocabulary tasks (Salthouse, 1993). The Information Test
required participants to answer general knowledge questions in a variety of areas, and a metaanalysis suggests that this measure has a test-retest reliability of 0.92 (Calamia, Markon, &
Tranel, 2013). The Synonym vocabulary (Chronbach’s alpha = .67) and Antonym vocabulary
(Chronbach’s alpha = .79) tasks required participants to choose synonyms or antonyms,
respectively, from among five possible choices (Salthouse, 2001).
The fluid intelligence tasks included a paper folding task (Ekstrom, French, Harman, &
Dermen, 1976), a letter sets task (Ekstrom, French, Harman, & Dermen, 1976), and the odd
numbered questions in the Raven’s Advanced Progressive Matrices Set II (Raven, 1990). For the
paper folding task, participants were shown a sequence in which a square piece of paper was
folded. The final image in the sequence showed where a pencil was poked through one location
on the folded paper. Participants had to choose which of five options correctly displayed the
locations of the holes on the unfolded piece of paper. Participants completed two sets of ten
questions each. They were given three minutes for each set of questions. Each question was
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presented by itself on the computer screen and participants were allowed to click a button to skip
questions if they chose. For the letter sets task, participants were shown five strings of four
letters each. Participants were instructed to choose the string that did not match the pattern that
the remainder of the letter strings followed. Participants were given seven minutes to complete
fifteen questions. Reliability data is not available in the literature for the Letter Sets and Paper
Folding tasks. Therefore split-half reliability for these tasks was calculated using data from the
current study (see results section for the results of these analyses). The Raven’s Advanced
Progressive Matrices task required participants to choose which of eight items completed the
pattern shown at the top of the screen. The correct item matched the pattern vertically and
horizontally. Participants were given ten minutes to complete eighteen questions (Kane et al.,
1990). The Raven’s Advanced Progressive Matrices has high internal consistency (Chronbach’s
alpha = .83; Paul, 1985) and test-retest reliability (r = .83; Bors & Forrin, 1995)
2.4.4

Prediction Battery

The prediction battery consisted of four different tasks: the predictive looking at action task
(PLAT), a visual world task (Altmann & Kamide, 1999), a weather prediction task (Knowlton,
Squire, & Gluck, 1994), and the Iowa gambling task (Bechara, Damasio, Tranel, and Damasio,
1997).
As described earlier, the PLAT is a novel task that we have recently developed in the
laboratory. For this task, participants passively watched 5-6 minute movies of an actor
performing everyday activities while their eyes were tracked using an eye tracker. These movies
included many goal-directed sequences of activity in which the actor orients toward an object,
picks up the object, and then completes an action with that object. Predictive performance on this
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task was measured by examining how early participants looked at objects before the actor came
into contact with them. This task allowed for a relatively continuous measure of prediction.
To calculate performance on this task, an experimenter first identified all of the time points
at which the actor came into contact with an object. Dynamic interest areas were then drawn
around each contacted object. The dynamic interest areas were placed to capture fixations on the
object of interest ranging from 3000 ms before contact to 1000 ms after contact. Interest areas
were placed using the following rules: (1) All interest areas were rectangular in shape, (2) No
interest areas were allowed to overlap in time and space, (3) If potential interest areas
overlapped, only the first interest area was kept, (4) If the actor contacted an object by touching
it with another object, the object in direct contact with the actor was considered the object of
interest (e.g., if the actor put a bowl on the counter, the bowl was considered the object of
interest), (5) Only objects that were fully onscreen when contacted were considered objects of
interest, (6) If the longest dimension of an object was smaller than 105 pixels (visual angle of
2.9°), the interest area was created around the entire object, and if the longest dimension of an
object was larger than 105 pixels, the interest area was created around the part of the object that
the actor contacted, and (7) For objects smaller than 48 pixels (visual angle of 1.3°) on any side,
interest areas were created with a minimum size of 48 pixels per side. (See Figure 2 for an
example movie frame with an interest area highlighted).
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Figure 2. An example frame taken from one of the three movies used in this study. The yellow
box represents the interest area, which was drawn around the chandelier—the object the actor is
about to contact in order to put up the streamer. The purple dot represents the gaze location of an
example participant who watched this movie. Here, the participant looked at the chandelier
before the actor contacted it. During the study, participants saw neither the yellow box nor their
own gaze location.
Once these dynamic interest areas were created in Data Viewer, the amount of time
participants spent fixating within each interest area during the 3000 ms before contact was
calculated. The 3000 ms before contact was divided into thirty 100 ms bins, and bins with more
than 20% of the eye tracking data missing were dropped from later analyses. Growth curve
modeling was conducted using the lmer package in R (Bates, Maechler, Bolker, & Walker, 2015)
to obtain growth estimates over the 30 time bins for the random effect of subjects. Growth curve
modeling provides an estimate of how performance on a task changes over time and tests
whether allowing each subject’s growth over time to have different intercepts, linear slopes,
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and/or quadratic slopes improves the fit of the model. All variables entered into the growth curve
models were z-scored to ensure that the variances were at a similar scale. Three models were
tested: 1) a model that only allowed the intercept to vary by subject, 2) a model that allowed the
intercept and linear slope to vary by subject, and 3) a model that allowed the intercept and both
the linear and quadratic slopes to vary by subject. For all of these models, movie was also
included as a random effect, but only the intercept was allowed to vary by movie.
For the visual world task (Altmann & Kamide, 1999), the eye-tracker was used to obtain
participants’ gaze location while they viewed arrays of objects and listened to sentences that
included some of the objects. The sentences all had the following structure: an article, a noun, a
verb, a person’s name, and a noun that was the subject of the verb (e.g., The boy kicked Tracy’s
ball). On some trials, the verb was predictive of only one object in the array (predictive trials; 12
trials of this type per subject), while on other trials, the verb was not predictive of any individual
object in the array (unpredictive trials; 12 trials of this type per subject). For example, one array
of objects included a picture of football, a tennis ball, a toy truck, and a piece of broccoli. The
predictive sentence was, “The woman steamed Paul’s broccoli,” and the unpredictive sentence
was, “The woman put away Paul’s broccoli” (See Figure 3). Predictive looking was measured by
determining how much earlier participants looked at the target picture while listening to
predictive sentences than while listening to unpredictive sentences. Three types of control
sentences were also included: 1) the verb predicted two of the objects (8 trials per subject), 2) the
verb predicted three of the objects (8 trials per subject), and 3) the verb did not apply to any of
the objects (20 trials per subject). Participants heard a beep immediately after the end of each
sentence, and they were instructed to press one button if they thought the sentence applied to any
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of the pictures on the screen and press a different button if they thought the sentence did not
apply to any of the pictures. They were told to wait until they heard the beep to respond.

Figure 3. Example stimulus from the visual world task. The predictive sentence for this trial was
“The woman steamed Paul’s broccoli,” and the unpredictive sentence was “The woman put away
Paul’s broccoli.”
To calculate performance on this task, an experimenter first determined the amount of time
between the verb and the subject in each predictive and unpredictive sentence, hereafter referred
to as verb-subject distance. The verb-subject distance ranged from 1406 ms to 2400 ms (mean =
1892.68 ms). Then, the proportion of time spent looking at the target object during the verbsubject distance during the predictive sentences was calculated. To ensure that the amount of
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time spent looking at the target object was not due to the salience of that particular object, a
control measure of looking time was calculated using the same object in the matched
unpredictive sentence that only differed in the verb. Because each participant only heard one
version of each sentence, the mean looking time across participants who heard the unpredictive
sentence was used as the control for each predictive sentence.
For the weather prediction task (Knowlton, Squire, & Gluck, 1994), participants were told to
use cues to predict whether there would be rain or sun. On each trial, they saw one, two, or three
cards, each with geometric symbols. Each combination of cards had a different probability of
predicting each outcome. For example, if cards three and four were presented, there was a .1
probability of rain, whereas if cards one and two were presented, there was a .9 probability of
rain (See Figure 4 for an example trial from this task). Each combination of cards was presented
in a random order with the frequency displayed in the P(cue) column of Table 2. (See Table 2 for
the cue card combinations, the frequency with which each combination was presented, and the
probability of rain given each combination.) Participants completed 200 trials of this task. For
each trial, prediction ability was measured by determining whether participants chose the optimal
response based on the cues given. Trials for which the probability of rain was 0.50 were scored
as correct regardless of the response given. The resulting accuracy scores for each trial were
entered into a logistic growth curve model using the lmer package in R (Bates, Maechler, Bolker,
& Walker, 2015), with trial number as the time variable and trial by trial accuracy as the
dependent variable. The logistic slope was allowed to vary randomly by subject. Trial number
was z-scored to improve numerical precision.
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Figure 4. Example trial from the weather prediction task.
Table 2: Design of Weather Prediction Task (Modified from
Knowlton, Squire, & Gluck, 1994)
Pattern
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14

1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

Cue
2 3
0 0
0 1
0 1
1 0
1 0
1 1
1 1
0 0
0 0
0 1
0 1
1 0
1 0
1 1

4
1
0
1
0
1
0
1
0
1
0
1
0
1
0

P (cue)
0.14
0.084
0.087
0.084
0.064
0.047
0.041
0.14
0.058
0.064
0.032
0.087
0.032
0.041

P (rain)
0.15
0.38
0.1
0.62
0.18
0.5
0.21
0.85
0.5
0.82
0.43
0.9
0.57
0.79

Finally, participants completed the Iowa gabling task on the computer. For each of 100
trials, participants were told to choose a card from one of four decks. Participants were told to
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choose cards to earn as much money as possible over the course of the task. Choosing cards from
the A and B decks resulted in large gains but larger losses and choosing cards from the C and D
decks resulted in small gains and smaller losses. The optimal strategy on this task was to choose
cards from the C and D decks. Participants could choose their own strategy for picking cards
from the decks, but after choosing forty cards from a single deck, that deck disappeared, and
participants had to start picking from one of the other decks. (See Figure 5 for an example trial
from the Iowa Gambling task.) Responses were scored as correct if the participant chose from
one of the decks that resulted in a higher long-term payout (decks C or D). A final score for this
task was calculated by summing the total number of correct responses over the one hundred trials
of this task. See the Results section for split-half reliability measures for this and each of the
other prediction tasks.

Figure 5. Example trial of the Iowa Gambling task. Participants began with $2,000 in their cash
pile and earned or lost money by choosing from decks A through D.
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2.4.5

Processing Speed

None of the tasks included in the battery described above directly tested processing speed;
however, response times for all of the tasks were collected, allowing for an approximation of
processing speed to be calculated. Originally, we planned to include response times for the visual
world task, the weather prediction task, the synonym vocabulary task, and the antonym
vocabulary task. However, as discussed in the results section below, preliminary analyses found
that the response times for these tasks did not correlate, and we therefore decided to use only the
response time for the visual world task, as this seemed the purest measure of processing speed
available from the battery of tasks.
2.5 Modeling
Confirmatory factor analysis was used to determine whether the cognitive ability measures
loaded onto the predicted latent variables, and whether the predictive processing tasks loaded
onto the hypothesized latent variable. Model fit was calculated using the Tucker-Lewis Index
(TLI), the Standardized Root Mean Square Residual (SRMR), the comparative fit index (CFI),
and the root-mean squared error of approximation (RMSEA). The TLI compares the chi-square
value of the model to the chi-square of the null-model (which specifies that there are no
correlations among the measured variables) and takes into account model complexity; the SRMR
is the square root of the difference between the residuals of the sample covariance matrix and the
hypothesized covariance model; the CFI compares the fitted model with the null model, which
specifies that the covariance of the variables is 0; and the RMSEA provides an estimate of how
well the model fits the population covariance matrix. Hu and Bentler (1999) suggest that for
sample sizes under 500, model fit is considered good when the TLI is greater than .95 and the
SRMR is less than .09. They also suggest that model fit is good when the CFI is .95 or higher
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and the RMSEA is .06 or lower. In addition, because of the relatively small sample size, the
Swain correction (Herzog, Boomsma, & Reinecke, 2007), which reduces the bias of model fit
estimators when the ratio of sample size to the number of estimated parameters is at least two to
one, was used to correct bias in the TLI, CFI, and RMSEA. It was planned a priori to use
structural equation modeling to test the model shown in Figure 6 if the confirmatory factor
analyses found that the hypothesized prediction and general cognitive functioning latent
variables provided a good fit for the data.

Figure 6. Proposed model structure with all four of the prediction tasks loading onto a predictive
processing latent variable. This predictive processing latent variable was hypothesized to load
onto the general cognitive functioning variable, and the crystallized and fluid intelligence
constructs were hypothesized to load onto the general cognitive functioning latent variable.
An additional model that included PTSD symptom severity was also tested to determine
whether higher PTSD symptom severity affects prediction ability and general cognitive
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functioning. The hypothesized model that includes PTSD symptom severity is shown in Figure
7.

Figure 7. Model structure with PTSD as an additional predictor of general cognitive functioning
and predictive processing.
Finally, an additional model, in which the fluid and crystallized intelligence constructs
predict performance on each of the prediction tasks, was also tested to determine whether
performance on the prediction tasks was simply a combination of other forms of cognitive
functioning rather than a separate construct. This model is shown Figure 8.
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Figure 8. Model structure with crystallized and fluid intelligence constructs predicting
performance on each of the prediction tasks.
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Chapter 3: Results
3.1 Individual Task Performance
3.1.1

PTSD Questionnaires
Total PTSD severity scores and symptom cluster scores were calculated for each

participant (mean = 10.65, SD = 13.10, range: 0 to 60). The suggested cut-off score for probable
PTSD is 33 (National Center for Posttraumatic Stress Disorder, and only 19 participants had a
score of 33 or above. See Figure 9 for the distribution of PTSD severity scores. To determine
whether the scores on this measure followed the expected factor structure, scores for each
question were entered into a confirmatory factor analysis with each symptom loading on the
appropriate symptom cluster latent factor and all of the symptom cluster latent factors loading
onto a total PTSD score latent factor.
The model for the confirmatory factor analysis had a TLI of .834, a SRMR of .068, a CFI of
.855, and a RMSEA of .106. Although the SRMR suggests that the model is an adequate fit for
the data, the other measures suggest that this model should not be considered a good fit for the
data. This means that the factor structure of PTSD symptoms in this sample only loosely fits the
factor structure of PTSD in the DSM-5. Therefore, while scores on the PTSD questionnaires
were used in subsequent analyses, results from these analyses should be considered in the
context of a less than adequate model fit. See Table 3 for the standardized factor loadings for
each question on the PCL-5. As is evident from this table, the factor loadings for reexperiencing,
avoidance, and alterations in mood and cognition were very high. However, some of the factor
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loadings for increased arousal were lower, which may have contributed to the failure of the
model to adequately fit the data in this study.

Figure 9. Distribution of PTSD Severity Scores. The suggested cut-off score for probable PTSD
is 33, represented by the dotted line (National Center for Posttraumatic Stress Disorder).
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Table 3. Factor loadings for the PCL-5
p

Standardized
Loading

Reexperiencing
Q1
Q2
Q3
Q4
Q5

<.001
<.001
<.001
<.001

0.65
0.66
0.82
0.82

Avoidance
Q6
Q7

<.001

0.84

Alterations in Cognition and Mood
Q8
Q9
Q10
Q11
Q12
Q13
Q14

<.001
<.001
<.001
<.001
<.001
<.001

0.86
0.80
0.86
0.75
0.79
0.73

Increased Arousal
Q15
Q16
Q17
Q18
Q19
Q20

<.001
<.001
<.001
<.001
<.001

0.53
0.57
0.61
0.87
0.73

PTSD
Reexperiencing
Avoidance
Alterations in Cognition and Mood
Increased Arousal

<.001
<.001
<.001

0.91
0.88
0.82

3.1.2

Crystallized and Fluid Intelligence Measures

Scores on the Synonym Vocabulary, Antonym Vocabulary, and Information tasks were
summed to generate a total score for each task. See Table 4 for descriptive statistics for these
tasks.
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Table 4: Descriptive Statistics
Mean

SD

Min

Max

Crystallized
Synonym
6.51
2.21
1.00
10.00
Antonym
6.34
2.11
1.00
10.00
Information
17.35
3.46
5.00
23.00
Fluid
Letter Sets
11.40
2.29
3.50
15.00
Paper Folding
12.95
3.57
1.00
Raven's
11.58
2.62
3.00
18.00
Prediction Battery
PLAT
1.15
0.40
0.15
2.15
VW
0.00
0.04
-0.11
0.11
Weather
0.00
0.00
-0.01
0.01
Iowa Gambling
63.82
10.91
32.00
80.00
Processing Speed
509.00*
243.28
230.00
2703.00
PTSD
10.65
13.1
0.00
60.00
Note: PLAT = Predictive Looking at Action Task; VW = Visual World
*The median for the processing speed measure.
Scores on the Raven’s Progressive Matrices task were also summed to generate a total score
for each participant. For the Letter Sets and Paper Folding tasks, participants received one point
for every correct response and lost .25 points for every incorrect response. An error in the
Experiment Builder code for the Letter Sets and Paper Folding tasks caused the program to skip
through items and report an extremely short reaction time of less than 100 ms. This affected
twenty participants for the Letter Sets task (one participant was missing three items, eight
participants were missing two items, and eleven participants were missing one item), and twenty
participants for the Paper Folding task (one participant was missing five items, three participants
were missing four items, one participant was missing three items, eight participants were missing
two items, and seven participants were missing one item). Missing responses for each task were
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imputed using the mean score for the non-missing responses1. The split-half reliability for the
Letter Sets task was 0.44 and the split-half reliability for the Paper Folding task was 0.65. The
low split half reliability for these tasks are quite low, which may be due, in part, to the small
number of items for each task (15 for the Letter Sets task and 20 for the Paper Folding task). See
Table 4 for descriptive statistics for these tasks.
3.1.3

Prediction Battery

For the PLAT, three growth curve models were tested: 1) a model that only allowed the
intercept to vary by subject, 2) a model that allowed the intercept and linear slope to vary by
subject, and 3) a model that allowed the intercept and both the linear and quadratic slopes to vary
by subject. A comparison of these models suggested that the model with random intercepts and
linear and quadratic slopes provided the best fit for the data (χ2 (3) = 970.26, p < .001). For this
model, the fixed linear (t = -26.49, p < .001) and quadratic (t = 38.23, p < .001) effects of time
bin were significant. In addition, the random intercept for movie had a variance of 0.09 (SD =
.29), and the residual variance was 0.22 (SD = .46). The random intercept for subject had a
variance of 0.11 (SD = .34), the random linear slope for subject had a variance of .02 (SD = .16),
and the random quadratic slope for subject had a variance of .17 (SD = .41). The intercept and
random linear slope were correlated with r = -0.74, the intercept and quadratic random slope
were correlated with r = 0.89, and the linear and quadratic random slopes were correlated with r
1

Multiple imputation was not performed because participants were allowed to skip items, which

likely resulted in non-random missing data. To ensure that imputing using the mean did not
significantly affect the results, a follow-up analysis was performed in which the missing data
were not imputed, and instead were treated as missing. All of the models were then tested using
the resulting data. The pattern of results was identical to that reported below.

51

= -0.97. Because the linear and quadratic random slopes were so highly correlated, only the
quadratic random slope was used as an individual difference measure in later analyses. A split
half reliability test found that this individual difference measure had adequate reliability (r =
0.79, p < .001). (See Figure 10 for subject level data for this task and Table 4 for descriptive
statistics for this task.)

Figure 10. Participant level data for the PLAT. Each colored line represents one participant’s
performance on this task. The x-axis represents the 3000 ms before contact for the interest areas,
divided into 100 ms bins. The y-axis represents the number of milliseconds participants spent
looking in the interest areas during each 100 ms bin.
For the visual world task, two sentences were dropped from further analysis because they
engendered very low predictive looking across participants, with participants only looking at the
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target item 3% or 4% of the time during the predictive sentences. Then, the data from the
remaining 22 items were entered into a mixed-effects model with the time spent looking at the
target in the predictive sentences as the dependent variable and the time spent looking at the
target in the unpredictive sentences as the independent variable. Only the intercept was allowed
to vary by subject. The residuals from this model represented the time spent looking at the target
item, controlling for the saliency of the item. The residuals for each item were averaged for each
participant to get a predictive looking measure. Split-half reliability for the predictive looking
measure was .53, and although this split-half reliability was lower than what is typically
preferred, other scoring methods produced even lower reliability. (See Table 4 for descriptive
statistics for the predictive looking measure for this task.) This predictive looking measure was
entered into the structural equation models as the individual differences measure for the visual
world task.
In addition, to ensure that the results in this study replicated results from other studies
that have used the visual world paradigm, predictive looking results for the predictive and
unpredictive sentences were plotted in Figure 11. It is evident from this figure that participants
generally spent more time looking at the target object when the verb was predictive of only the
target object compared to sentences in which the verb could reference all of the objects in the
display. These results replicate those found in other studies of the visual world paradigm (e.g.,
Altmann and Kamide, 1999).
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Figure 11. Predictive looking results for the visual world task. The time from verb onset to noun
onset was warped into 28 bins with varying numbers of milliseconds in each bin, and these 28
bins are on the x-axis. The y-axis represents the cumulative proportion of time participants spent
looking at the target object. The shaded regions around each line represent the 95% confidence
intervals.
For the weather prediction task, the results from the logistic growth curve model
suggested that the fixed effect of the logistic slope was significant (z = 8.001, p < .001). In
addition, the random intercept had a variance of 0.25 (SD = .50), and the random logistic slope
had a variance of .05 (SD = .22). The random logistic slope was used as the individual
differences measure in subsequent analyses. (See Figure 12 for the logistic curves fit for each
participant and Table 4 for descriptive statistics for this task.)
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Figure 12. Participant level logistic general linear model results for the weather prediction task.
Each colored line in this figure represents the best-fit logistic slope for an individual participant.
The black line represents the overall model estimate for the logistic slope.
For the Iowa gambling task, responses were scored as correct if the participant chose
from one of the decks that resulted in a higher long-term payout (decks C or D). A final score for
this task was calculated by summing the total number of correct responses over the one hundred
trials of this task. (See Table 4 for descriptive statistics for this task.)
3.1.4

Processing Speed

First, response times for visual world, weather prediction, synonym vocabulary, and
antonym vocabulary tasks were calculated for each participant using the mean response time
across items. For the weather prediction tasks, only response times for the last 50 trials of the
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task that also only had one card presented were used for the processing speed measure. However,
most of the correlations were very low (see Table 5). To ensure that the low correlations were
not due to very long response times for some trials, the median response time and the 30th
percentile response time was calculated for each item and then averaged within participants to
obtain a potential processing speed measure. However, a similar pattern of correlations emerged
from these analyses as well (see Table 6). Therefore, the median response time for the visual
world task was used as a measure of processing speed for future analyses, as this seemed, a
priori, to be the best measure of processing speed available from the tasks included in this study.
(See Table 4 for descriptive statistics for this measure of processing speed.)
Table 5: Correlations of Means for Processing Speed Tasks
VW
Weather
VW
1.00
0.04
Weather
0.04
1.00
Syonym
-0.10
0.15
Antonym
-0.08
0.17
Note: VW = Visual World Task

Synonym
-0.10
0.15
1.00
0.76

Antonym
-0.08
0.17
0.76
1.00

Table 6: Correlations of Medians and 30th Percentiles*
VW
Weather
Synonym
Antonym
VW
1.00/1.00
0.11/0.12
0.13/0.12
0.08/0.11
Weather
0.11/0.12
1.00/1.00
0.15/0.18
0.16/0.25
Synonym
0.13/0.12
0.15/0.18
1.00/1.00
0.79/0.75
Antonym
0.08/0.11
0.16/0.25
0.79/0.75
1.00/1.00
*Number before the slash is the correlation of the medians; Number after
the slash is the correlation of the 30th percentiles
Note: VW = Visual World Task

3.1.5

Summary of Individual Differences Measures

For the crystallized and fluid intelligence tasks, final score on these measures were entered
into the structural equation models as the individual differences measure. For the PLAT, the
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quadratic random slopes representing the time each participant spent looking at the target object
over the three seconds before contact were used as the individual differences measure in the
structural equation models. For the visual world task, the individual differences measure was the
average time each participant spent looking at the target objects, controlling for the saliency of
the objects. The individual differences measure for the weather prediction task was the random
logistic slope representing subject level growth in performance over the trials of the task. For the
Iowa gambling task, the individual differences measure was the total number of correct
responses over all trials of the task. Finally, for the models that included PTSD severity score,
total PTSD severity was used as the individual differences measure.
3.2 Modeling
First, a confirmatory factor analysis was conducted to determine whether responses on
the synonym, antonym, and Information tasks loaded onto a crystallized intelligence latent factor
and whether responses on the Raven’s Progressive Matrices, letter sets, and paper folding tasks
loaded onto a fluid intelligence latent factor. This model also included a term for the correlation
of the crystallized and fluid latent factors. A second model in which the crystallized and fluid
latent factors loaded onto a general intelligence latent factor (g) was also tested.
The same model fit indices as discussed above were used to determine whether these
models provided a good fit for the data. For the model without the general intelligence latent
factor, the TLI was .984, the SRMR was .035, the CFI was .991, and the RMSEA was .037. The
Swain correction was then applied to correct for potential bias of model fit estimators. Using this
correction, the TLI was .98, the CFI was .99, and the RMSEA was .036. All of these measures
suggest that the model provided a good fit for the data. Figure 13 displays the factor weights for
this model. However, the correlation between the crystallized and fluid latent factors was 0.09,
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suggesting that these factors would not load onto a single general intelligence latent factor.
Therefore, the second model that included a single general intelligence latent factor was not
tested, and a latent factor for overall cognitive functioning was not included in any of the
following models.

Figure 13. Results of the confirmatory factor analysis for the general intelligence measures. Ant
= Antonym Vocabulary task; Syn = Synonym Vocabulary task; Inf = Information task; PpF =
Paper Folding task; LtS = Letter Sets task; Rvn = Raven’s Progressive Matrices; Crys =
crystallized intelligence latent factor; Fld = fluid intelligence latent factor.
The correlations among the four prediction tasks were very low, with none of the
correlations above .11. (See Table 7 for the correlations among these tasks.) Although it was
therefore unlikely that the four tasks would load onto a single latent factor, a confirmatory factor
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analysis was performed. Although the model converged, the fit indices suggested that this model
was misspecified. For this model, the CFI was 1.00, the TLI was -14.58, the RMSEA was 0.00,
and the SRMR was .01. Inspecting the loadings onto the latent factor revealed that none of the
prediction tasks significantly loaded onto the latent variable, which was unsurprising given the
low correlations among the tasks.
Table 7: Correlations among the prediction tasks
PLAT
VW
Weather
IGT
PLAT
1.00
0.07
0.07
0.10
VW
0.07
1.00
0.02
0.11
Weather
0.07
0.02
1.00
0.01
IGT
0.10
0.11
0.01
1.00
Note: PLAT = Predictive Looking at Action Task; VW = Visual World
Task
Because the prediction tasks did not load onto a single latent factor, the planned structural
equation models could not be tested. Therefore, the model in Figure 14 was tested to determine
whether fluid intelligence, crystallized intelligence, and processing speed predicted performance
on each of the individual prediction tasks. The simple correlations among these measures are
given in Table 8. For this model, the TLI was .95, the SRMR was .04, the CFI was .97, and the
RMSEA was .04. After applying the Swain correction, the TLI was .95, the CFI was .97, and the
RMSEA was .04. These fit indices suggest that this model provided a good fit for the data. For
this model, the standardized regression coefficient for the relationship between crystallized
intelligence and the PLAT was negative and significant (-0.17, p = .02), which was quite
surprising given that knowledge of what tends to happen in a given situation would be expected
to improve performance on the PLAT. The standardized regression coefficient for the
relationship between fluid intelligence and the weather prediction task was significant (0.18, p =
.02). Furthermore, the standardized regression coefficients for the relationships between the Iowa
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gambling Task and crystallized intelligence (0.17, p = .03) and fluid intelligence (.16, p = .04)
were significant. Finally, the relationship between processing speed and the PLAT (-.13, p =
.047) was significant. All of the other regression coefficients were not significant. (See Figure 14
for the path diagram with all of the standardized estimates.)
Table 8. Simple correlations between the prediction tasks and the crystallized and fluid
intelligence tasks.
PLAT
Visual World
Weather Pred.
Iowa Gambling

Antonym
-0.12
-0.08
-0.03
0.13

Synonym
-0.12
-0.02
0.06
0.18

Information
-0.02
0.05
-0.03
0.20

Paper Fold. Letter Sets
0.04
0.00
0.08
0.11
0.16
0.08
0.08
0.08

Ravens
0.06
-0.05
0.11
0.20

Figure 14. Path diagram. PLA = Predictive Looking at Action Task, VW = Visual World task,
Wth = Weather Prediction, IGT = Iowa Gambling Task, Cry = Crystallized Intelligence, Fld =
Fluid Intelligence, Ant = Antonym Vocabulary, Syn = Synonym Vocabulary, Inf = Information,
PpF = Paper Folding, LtS = Letter Sets, Rvn = Raven’s Progressive Matrices, PrS = Processing
Speed. The weights of the arrows represent the magnitude of the path coefficients. A star next to
a regression coefficient indicates a significant beta weight.
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The final model included PTSD symptom severity as a predictor of performance on the
crystallized and fluid intelligence latent factors as well as each of the four prediction tasks. For
this model, the TLI was .95, the SRMR was .04, the CFI was .97, and the RMSEA was .03. After
applying the Swain correction, the TLI was .96, the CFI was .98, and the RMSEA was .03. These
fit indices suggest that this model also provides a good fit for the data. However, none of the
regression coefficients for the relationships between PTSD symptom severity and the other tasks
and latent variables were significant (PLAT: 0.02, p = .73; VW: -0.02, p = .76; Weather: -0.08, p
= .24; IGT: -0.04, p = .50; Fluid: -0.01, p =. 91; Crystallized: -0.04, p = .61), suggesting that
PTSD symptom severity was not related to performance on the other tasks included in this study.
(See Figure 15 for the path diagram with all of the standardized estimates.)

Figure 15. Path diagram for the model that included PTSD as a predictor of performance on the
tasks. PLA = Predictive Looking at Action Task, VW = Visual World task, Wth = Weather
Prediction, IGT = Iowa Gambling Task, Cry = Crystallized Intelligence, Fld = Fluid Intelligence,
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Ant = Antonym Vocabulary, Syn = Synonym Vocabªulary, Inf = Information, PTS = PTSD, PpF
= Paper Folding, LtS = Letter Sets, Rvn = Raven’s Progressive Matrices; PrS = Processing
Speed. The weights of the arrows represent the magnitude of the path coefficients.
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Chapter 4: Discussion
4.1 No Evidence for a Prediction Construct
The current study was the first to directly investigate the question of whether there is a
single higher-order integratory prediction mechanism in the brain, and the data provide evidence
against the existence of such a mechanism. Specifically, if there were a higher order integratory
prediction mechanism, performance on tasks that require prediction formation should have been
correlated, regardless of the task modality. However, in the current study, the PLAT, visual
world, weather prediction, and Iowa gambling tasks did not load onto a single latent factor, and
the correlations among these tasks were uniformly extremely low. This is in contrast with current
theories including the predictive coding theory (Friston, 2005) and Event Segmentation Theory
(Zacks, Speer, Swallow, Braver, & Reynolds, 2007), which both imply the existence of a higherorder integratory prediction mechanism. The results of the current study also differ from the
implications of previous neurophysiological and neuroimaging studies that found that similar
signals are sent from lower-order to higher-order brain areas and vice versa in many systems in
the brain (e.g, Tap & Bar, 2005; Tanaka et al, 2004; Dikker & Pylkkänen, 2003).
On the other hand, in concert with the results of the current study, neurophysiological data
provide evidence against an integratory prediction mechanism, as there are many different
prediction error signals in the brain (e.g., ERN, MMN, P300, N400, P600) rather than a single
error signal used by all brain systems that is sent to an integrative prediction mechanism. In
addition, in two of the very few studies that investigated performance on the weather prediction
and Iowa gambling tasks in the same participants, performance across these tasks was not as
similar as expected. For example, in a study of HIV positive participants with a history of
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substance dependence, there was no significant relationship between the weather prediction task
and the Iowa gambling task (Gonzales, Wardle, Jacobus, Vassileva, & Martin-Thormeyer, 2010).
Similarly, in a study investigating the effects of antipsychotic medications in patients with
schizophrenia, performance on the weather prediction task did not track performance on the Iowa
gambling task (Wasserman, Barry, Bradford, Delva, & Beninger, 2012). Although neither of
these previous studies included a control group of healthy adults, they do provide some
converging evidence in for the lack of correlations among the four prediction tasks in the current
study. The results of the current study therefore provide initial evidence against an integrative
prediction mechanism and suggest that current theories involving prediction may need further
examination.
If, as the results of the current study suggest, there is no higher-order integrative prediction
mechanism that allows for performance on prediction tasks that require multiple modalities, how
might people successfully perform these tasks? It is possible that when people engage in
prediction within a particular modality, a network of regions, including regions that are specific
to the primary task modality, is activated. If the task requires the integration of multiple sensory
modalities, the network of regions that is activated may simply include the additional regions
necessary for the second modality. While some of these areas would likely overlap, it could be
the activity in the separate areas that drives behavioral performance on the tasks. For example,
the Iowa gambling task, which requires visual processing, has been found to activate the
occipital cortex, medial frontal gyrus, and orbitofrontal cortex, among other areas, when
participants chose a risky deck compared to a safe deck (Lawrence, Jollant, O’Daly, Zelaya, and
Phillips, 2009). In addition to requiring predictions within the visual modality, the Iowa
Gambling task also involves reward processing, as participants obtain rewards and losses
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throughout the task. Tasks involving reward prediction often activate the striatum and
orbitofrontal cortex (e.g., Tanaka et al, 2004; Ernst et al., 2004). In fact, (Lawrence, Jollant,
O’Daly, Zelaya, and Phillips, 2009) found activation in the orbitofrontal cortex when participants
completed the Iowa gambling task compared to a control task in which participants were told
which choices to make. It is therefore possible that the activation patterns seen when participants
complete the Iowa gambling task are due to the activation of two separate brain networks—a
visual prediction network and a reward prediction network—that operate in parallel and therefore
appear to be a single activated network. Thus, overall performance on the Iowa gambling task
would depend on prediction ability in the two separate modalities, and performance might very
well not be correlated with a different task that requires predictions in a different modality (e.g.,
auditory predictions) which might activate yet another overlapping but different brain network.
This hypothesis of overlapping but separate brain networks that are activated by the distinct
predictive processing modalities involved in each task could explain the lack of correlations
among the prediction tasks included in the current study. For example, if a particular participant
tends to be better at making visual predictions than reward predictions, this participant might
obtain a higher score on the PLAT, which is primarily a visual task, than on the Iowa gambling
task, which also involves a reward prediction component. If participants have strengths and
weaknesses that drive performance differently on each task, the low correlations among the tasks
in the current study would be expected.
In addition to differences in the prediction modalities required by each task in the current
study, method variance across the tasks may provide a less interesting source for the lack of
correlations among the tasks, as individual differences in abilities other than prediction could
have overshadowed prediction ability as a driver of performance. For example, the weather
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prediction task may have required the ability to use spatial information while performing the
task, as the spatial configuration of the stimuli predicted the correct response. Evidence from
fMRI studies of probabilistic classification tasks provide support for this possibility. For
example, an fMRI study of a probabilistic classification task found activation in the parietal
cortex, an area that is often implicated in tasks involving spatial processing, during the time that
participants were likely making predictions about the category of the stimulus (Aron et al.,
2004). In fact, a second fMRI study of a different probabilistic classification task also found
activation in the parietal lobe when participants experienced uncertainty about their response
(Huettel, Song, & McCarthy, 2005). If some participants were better at learning spatial
information, these participants may have performed better on this task regardless of their ability
to make predictions, which would lower overall correlations among the tasks.
Similarly, each of the other tasks also includes components, distinct from prediction, which
could drive performance. For example, Li, Lu, D’Argembeau, Ng, and Bechara (2010) suggest
that the Iowa gambling task requires the processing of risk, finding that when people perform the
task, the amygdala signals the presence of risk to the orbito-frontal/venteromedial prefrontal
cortex. Though risk evaluation likely plays a role in making predictions in the Iowa gambling
task, the other tasks in the current study did not heavily involve the evaluation of risk, which
could explain the low correlations between this task and the other prediction tasks.
The visual world task very clearly involves a language processing component that is not
relevant for any of the other tasks in the current study. Therefore, if participants varied in their
ability to process language information, this may have masked the effect of individual
differences in prediction ability on performance of the visual world task. An imaging study on a
task that is conceptually similar to the visual world paradigm, in which participants listened to
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sentences and chose which of three or four line drawings in a array best represented the content
of the sentences, provides evidence that language comprehension is necessary for successful
performance on the task (Dronkers, Wilkins, Van Valin, Redfern, & Jaeger, 2004). The authors
found that lesions in the posterior middle temporal gyrus and anterior superior temporal gyrus,
which are areas involved in language comprehension, strongly affected performance on the task.
Therefore, it is possible that performance on the visual world task did not correlate with
performance on the other tasks because difference in language processing dominated prediction
ability in driving individual differences on this task.
Finally, successful performance on the PLAT requires participants to quickly process human
action, an ability that was not required by any of the other tasks. Imaging studies have found
evidence that when participants watch another person perform a task, the participants create a
motor program for completing a task that is very similar to the motor program participants use
when performing the task themselves (e.g., Flanagan & Johansson, 2003, but see Caramazza,
Anzellotti, Strnad, & Lingnau, 2014 for an evaluation of this and another potential mechanism).
If individual differences in people’s ability to create a motor program dominated individual
differences in prediction ability, low correlations between performance on the PLAT and the
other prediction tasks might be expected. Overall, given that each of the four prediction tasks
included in this study likely involve different mechanism (e.g., spatial processing, risk
processing, language processing, and motor planning), in addition to prediction, individual
differences in each of these other abilities may have resulted in the lack of correlations among
the tasks observed in the current study.
There is, however, another possible explanation for the finding in the current study: Perhaps
the tasks used in the current study did not require the intervention of an integrator or arbiter
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because information from various sensory modalities did not conflict in these tasks. Maybe an
integratory process only becomes active, and therefore only drives performance, when conflict
resolution is necessary. For example, on the visual world task, both the visual information
participants saw and the auditory information participants heard drove eye movements to the
same object. There were no trials in which the auditory information directed eye movements to
one object but visual information directed eye movements to a different object. If the tasks did
not, in fact, require conflict resolution, the conclusion that there is no higher order prediction
mechanism that drives performance on various types of prediction tasks is likely generally true,
but there may also be a separate mechanism that arbitrates conflict across many types of tasks. In
fact, there is suggestion in the literature that the anterior cingulate cortex may play a conflict
resolution role across a wide variety of tasks (e.g., Botvinick, Cohen, & Carter), although there is
also evidence that conflict resolution does not adequately describe the full function of the
anterior cingulate cortex (e.g., Brown and Braver, 2005).
In addition, it is possible that there is a higher-order prediction mechanism that integrates
information from various modalities, but that people, or at least the participants in the current
study, do not differ in their ability to integrate information in order to make predictions. This
potential lack of individual differences could result in low correlations among the tasks, because
individual differences are necessary in order to find correlations. The fact that participants had a
wide range of scores on each of the individual tasks used in this study at least suggests that there
were individual differences on the tasks, but this does not necessarily mean that people differed
in their ability to combine the information they gained from different modalities and use this
integrated information to make predictions. However, it would likely be difficult to determine
whether there are individual differences in the ability to integrate information from various
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modalities and make predictions based on this combined information. For example, it is difficult
to find a study design that would be able to differentiate between true integration of information
from multiple sensory modalities versus separate representations of information from each
modality that are nevertheless all used to guide behavior. Imaging studies could potentially
identify networks that are activated by tasks that require integration of information, and these
networks could be compared to the networks activated by tasks that only require the use of a
single modality. If a multi-modality task requires brain regions that are not activated by separate
tasks that require each of the modalities included in the multi-modality task, this would provide
some evidence that performance on multi-modality tasks requires more than just the concurrent
activation of networks specialized for the various modalities. On the other hand, it seems
unlikely that participants would display such high variability on all of the individual tasks and no
variability on prediction integration. Furthermore, it seems likely that individual differences in
prediction integration (if such integration occurs) would exist, given that so many other higher
cognitive functions, including working memory, attention, and executive function, do show
individual differences. Therefore, the results of this study are more consistent with the absence of
a higher-order integratory mechanism than with an integratory process that does not vary across
individuals.
4.2 Measures of General Intelligence Predict Performance on Some Prediction Tasks
Although the prediction tasks did not load onto a single latent factor, the measures of general
intelligence did correlate with performance on some of the prediction tasks. In particular, higher
crystallized intelligence predicted worse performance on the PLAT and better performance on
the Iowa gambling task. In addition, higher fluid intelligence predicted better performance on the
weather prediction task and the Iowa gambling task. Finally, there was a negative relationship
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between performance on the PLAT and processing speed. Although hypotheses about these
relationships are post-hoc, the positive relationships between fluid intelligence and performance
on the weather prediction and Iowa gambling tasks seem reasonable, as the ability to process
new information and use that new information to complete tasks does seem related to fluid
intelligence. In fact, previous research on the Iowa gambling task has found some support for the
relationship between this task and general intelligence (e.g., Monterosso, Ehrman, Napier,
O’Brien, & Childress, 2001), though other studies have found no relationship between
performance on this task and IQ (e.g., Bechara et al., 2001; Brand, Recknor, Grabenhorst, &
Bechara, 2007). In addition, the negative relationship between performance on the PLAT and
processing speed (where a smaller processing speed score means faster responses) suggests that
people who have faster processing speeds perform better on the PLAT, potentially because they
are faster at predicting which object the actor is about to touch.
On the other hand, the positive relationship between the Iowa gambling task and crystallized
intelligence was surprising because the ability to learn from new information, more than prior
knowledge, would be expected to drive performance on this task. However, results from a
previous study provide support for the current finding of the relationship between crystallized
intelligence and performance on the Iowa gambling task: in a study of undergraduate students,
participants who scored higher on the vocabulary measure also performed better on the Iowa
gambling task (Damaree, Burns, & DeDonno, 2010. One potential explanation for the positive
relationship is that participants with higher crystallized intelligence may have had more prior
experience with the Iowa gambling task than participants with lower crystallized intelligence.
For example, most of the participants in the current study were undergraduate students, and
students who were further along in their education may both have had higher crystallized
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intelligence and have taken more psychology classes in which they were exposed to the Iowa
gambling task. Participants were not debriefed about their prior experience with the tasks, so it is
not possible to determine whether prior experience drove the relationship. Similarly, the
negative relationship between crystallized intelligence and performance on the PLAT was
unexpected. Performance on the PLAT would be expected to be driven, at least in part, by
schemas that include information about what typically happens in similar situations. Therefore,
more prior knowledge about situations and people’s typical behavior in given environments
would be expected to improve, rather than impair, performance. However, the negative
relationship between crystallized intelligence and the PLAT suggests that either prior schemas
are not related to crystallized intelligence or that schemas are less important for successful
performance on the PLAT than would be expected. Overall, replications are necessary to
determine whether the relationships among the general intelligence constructs and the prediction
tasks represent the true states of the relationships.
4.3 Posttraumatic Stress Disorder Did Not Predict Performance on Other Tasks
Although the model in Figure 15 that included PTSD as a predictor of the prediction tasks
did provide a good fit for the data, PTSD severity did not predict performance on the general
intelligence constructs or the prediction tasks. One possibility for the lack of significant
relationships is that most of the participants in this study reported low levels of PTSD severity,
with only a small number of participants in the middle to high range of severity, as can be seen in
Figure 9. In fact, only 19 participants were above the current recommended cut-point of 33 on
this measure. Therefore, there may not have been enough variability to see individual differences
in performance on the other tasks based on PTSD severity scores. It is also possible that
prediction ability is not impaired in PTSD. There have not been any studies investigating
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performance on the visual world task, the Iowa gambling task, or the weather prediction task in
people with PTSD, however, a recent study in our laboratory found that people with clinical
levels of PTSD performed worse than controls on the PLAT (Eisenberg, Zacks, Rodebaugh, &
Flores, in prep). Additional studies on the relationship between PTSD and various prediction
tasks are necessary to determine whether the restricted range of PTSD severity scores in this
study drove the lack of relationship between PTSD symptom severity and the prediction tasks.
4.4 Impact of Findings on Current Theories
4.4.1

Predictive Coding Model

As discussed in the introduction, the predictive coding model (Friston, 2005) suggests that
predictions occur in a hierarchical fashion, with higher-order areas using past experience to make
predictions and then sending those predictions to lower order areas. These lower order areas
compare the predictions to sensory information from the environment. When there is a mismatch
between the sensory information and the predictions, the lower-order areas send prediction error
signals to the higher-order areas, which then either update their predictions or change sampling
behavior so that incoming sensory information matches their predictions. Most of the research on
this theory has studied individual systems, but Adams, Friston, and Bastos (2015) argue that
because prediction errors can lead to both sensory and motor changes, the sensory and motor
systems should be considered “a single active inference machine” (p. 100). This is a strong
statement in support of a unified prediction mechanism in the brain, and Adams, Friston, and
Bastos support this statement with findings that the laminar, topographic, and physiological
characteristics of the sensory and motor cortices are quite similar.
However, given the results of the current study, it does not seem likely that Adams, Friston,
and Bastos (2015) are correct about the existence of a single active inference machine, despite
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the structural similarities of the systems. If all of the sensory and motor areas truly did act as a
single unified system, performance on the tasks included in the current study, which all required
activation of various sensory and motor areas, should have been correlated. Perhaps, instead of a
unified inference machine, each system separately engages in feed-forward and feedback signals
that allow for prediction within individual modalities. The structural similarities of the various
cortical areas that Adams, Friston, and Bastos (2015) use to support their proposition of a unified
inference machine may have developed as a parsimonious solution to developing complex
cortical structures, but their structural similarities do not necessitate that all of the individual
areas cohere into a unified prediction mechanism. Thus, while the current study does not provide
evidence against the entirety of the predictive coding model of the human brain, the results
reported here do suggest that a single unified prediction mechanism does not operate in the
human brain.
4.4.2

Event Segmentation Theory

Event Segmentation Theory (EST; Zacks, Speer, Swallow, Braver, & Reynolds, 2007)
provides a model of how people comprehend ongoing, dynamic activity. It proposes that people
use their existing knowledge about typical situations (event schema) to create a representation of
the current situation, and use this event model along with incoming sensory information to make
predictions about what is going to happen next. When mismatches between predictions and
incoming sensory information develop, the event model is updated to better represent the current
situation. People perceive boundaries between events when this event model updating occurs
(Zacks, Speer, Swallow, Braver, & Reynolds, 2007), and better perception of these event
boundaries has been linked to increased memory for the events (Zacks, Speer, Vettel, & Jacoby,
2006).
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EST postulates that a single event model that encompasses modalities is used to generate
predictions about what will happen next. Although in any given situation, an event model could
include information from only a single sensory modality, it should also be able to incorporate
information from multiple modalities, as it is rare in everyday life for only a single modality to
be relevant. For example, while watching an actor complete an everyday activity, an observer’s
event model would likely include visual information about the current activity, auditory
information based on experience with the typical sounds generated by the activity, and motor
information that would include the motor sequences necessary to generate a similar action.
Therefore, EST proposes that multi-modality event models should be represented in some way in
the brain, and that these event models should then be used to generate predictions about the
future.
Most research on EST has studied event comprehension and prediction by having
participants watch movies of everyday activities or read narratives about people engaging in
activities, and it is possible that EST is limited to only these modalities. However, Zacks, Speer,
Swallow, Braver, & Reynolds (2007) suggest that people use event models as a basis for
prediction in every modality. For example, in the context of the current study, it might be
possible to explain performance on the weather prediction task using EST: When people start the
weather prediction task, they begin to learn the relationships between the geometric patterns on
the cards and the outcome of the trial. Over time, they begin to create an event model that
represents their current knowledge of these relationships. They make predictions about whether
there will be rain or sun on the basis of this developing event model, and when their predictions
are inaccurate, they update their event model to include the new information. Similar processes
likely occur as people perform the Iowa gambling task and the visual world task. The PLAT,
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though a novel task, is most similar to previous studies that have found evidence for EST. One
study using this task found that healthy adult participants took longer to look at the target object
when contact occurred around event boundaries than when contact occurred within an event
(Eisenberg & Zacks, in prep), suggesting that predictions failed more often at event boundaries
than within events. Performance on the PLAT, therefore, likely relies on the formation of event
models that are updated at times of high prediction error.
If an integrated event model that is used to drive predictions does exist, one would expect
that performance on the prediction tasks included in the current study would be correlated, as
performance on all of these tasks would be based, at least in part, on the ability to form accurate
event models; people who are better at forming event models should perform better on all of the
tasks, and people who are worse at forming event models should perform more poorly. However,
the low correlations among the four prediction tasks included in this study provide evidence
against the existence of such an event model. This leaves open four possibilities: (1) multi-modal
event models exist, but people do not vary in their ability to use event models to make
predictions, (2) event models are only used when people are processing naturalistic activity, (3)
event models consist of multiple separate representations from each of the separate sensory and
motor systems, and (4) multi-modal event models exist, but individual differences are driven by
modality specific prediction mechanisms that operate upstream of the event models.
First, it is possible that a unified event model does exist but people do not vary in their
ability to use such an event model to make predictions. This possibility is very similar to the
supposition, mentioned earlier, that people do not vary in their ability to integrate information in
order to make predictions. Yet, as previously discussed, there was adequate variability across
subjects on all of the tasks used in the current study. In particular, participants varied in their
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ability to perform the PLAT, and performance on this task has previously been found to track the
locations of event boundaries (Eisenberg and Zacks, in prep). Of the tasks included in the current
study, the PLAT should most strongly involve the creation of event models, suggesting that
participants were not identical in their ability to use event models to make predictions. Therefore,
low variability cannot explain the results of the current study or preserve the concept of a unified
event model.
Another possibility is that event models are limited to the domain of comprehending
naturalistic activity. In this case, performance on tasks that all involve the comprehension of
naturalistic activity should be correlated, even if performance relies on different sensory
modalities. For example, performance on the PLAT should be correlated with performance on
tasks in which participants listen to narratives of everyday activities (where prediction could be
measured through predictive looking at arrays of images representing characters or objects that
will soon be mentioned in the narrative) and on tasks in which participants read narratives of
everyday activities (where prediction could be measured by pausing reading and asking
participants to make explicit predictions about what will happen next). Although there have not
been studies that test prediction performance on these different types of event comprehension
tasks, the results of the current study and the principles of parsimony suggest that performance
would not be correlated across different types of event comprehension tasks. Specifically, if
unitary event models did exist, performance on all of the tasks used in this study should have
relied on such an integrative event model, as it is unlikely that an integrative event model would
be created solely during event comprehension tasks (e.g., the PLAT). There seems no reason for
integrative event models to be used solely for tasks that involve the comprehension of
naturalistic activities, when a similar mechanism could be used for many other types of tasks. In
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fact, it is arguably the case that all of the tasks included in the current study were everyday
events for the participants in the study, and therefore should have relied on integrative event
models. Participants completed the tasks in and among all of the other daily activities in which
they participated. Therefore, participants should have treated the tasks in the study as events,
created unified event models of their perceptions of each activity, and then used these unified
event models to make predictions that integrated information across modalities. In fact, it is very
likely that if other people were asked to watch a movie that included a period of time in which an
actor performed exactly the same tasks that were included in the present study, viewers would
identify event boundaries at the beginning and completion of each task. Consequently, it seems
unlikely that multi-modal event models that are used to make integrated predictions actually
exist.
Therefore, a third possibility is that event models consist of separate representations from
each sensory modality. Specifically, each of the sensory and motor systems may represent the
state of the environment separately. Then, when a task requires the use of multiple sensory
modalities, the necessary brain regions for each separate system may be activated in concert,
which would result in the likely incorrect perception that active integration has occurred. For
example, for the PLAT, visual areas and motor areas are likely both activated, and separate
prediction processes within the respective areas operating in parallel could create an illusion of
integration. A spike in prediction errors in one modality would lead to an updating of the
representation of that modality, and people would experience this updating as an event boundary.
If prediction errors spiked in multiple modalities at the same time (due to rapid changes in both
visual and auditory information, for example) people might experience an even stronger
perception of an event boundary.
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The existence of separate representations rather than a unified event model is consistent with
previous research evidence that prediction is more difficult around event boundaries (Zacks,
Kurby, Eisenberg, & Haroutunian, 2011): prediction in the modality or modalities relevant to the
rapid changes in the environment would be more difficult around event boundaries, though
prediction in other modalities would not be affected. The existence of separate event models is
also compatible with evidence that memory is updated at event boundaries (Swallow et al.,
2011), as memory for visual information, for example, might be updated around event
boundaries that are driven by visual changes in the environment, whereas memory for auditory
information might not be updated in response to visual changes. This account is also in accord
with previous research demonstrating that, at least during reading, components of event models
can be updated independently. For example, Curiel & Radvansky (2014) found that spatial shifts
and character shifts both slowed down reading time but the effects did not interact, suggesting
that they did not influence one another. Though the results of this study were interpreted to be
consistent with a unified event model that is updated incrementally rather than globally, the
results of this study can also be interpreted as evidence against a unified event model, where
representations of each type of shift are independent of one another and are used separately to
make predictions. However, this account is less consistent with recent research on working
memory updating. For example, Bailey & Zacks (2015) had participants read narratives that
included shifts in characters and locations and answer recognition memory probes interspersed
throughout the text. When these probes came after a shift in either character or location, people
were slower to answer questions about either dimension, suggesting that participants primarily
engaged in global event model updating. In addition, Radvansky, Tamplin, & Krawietz (2010)
found that word pairs that were unrelated to the visual environment were less well remembered
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after a visual and motor event boundary of walking through a doorway, which provides
additional evidence for an integrated event model and against separate representations of
information in each modality.
This leaves open the fourth possibility that unified event models exist and that people vary
in their ability to use event models to make predictions, but individual differences in prediction
are driven by modality-specific prediction mechanisms that operate upstream of a multi-modal
event model. In this case, each brain system would make predictions independently of one
another, and spikes in prediction error in any one modality could cause the unified event model
to update its representation of the current situation. This would mean that predictions might not
be correlated across task modality if prediction ability within each brain system differs within
individuals. For example, if a person makes very accurate predictions when tasks require
predictions based on visual information but experiences difficulty making predictions using
auditory information, that person would display quite different performance on prediction tasks
requiring each of the modalities. The lack of correlations among the four tasks used in the
current study is consistent with this possibility.
If it is indeed the case that individual differences are driven by modality-specific prediction
mechanisms and that a multi-modal event model is updated incrementally whenever there is a
spike in prediction error within any modality, some changes must be made to the EST model.
Specifically, instead of sensory information entering a single perceptual processing node,
sensory information from each modality would enter a perceptual processing node specific to the
modality. Each perceptual processing node would receive information from a unified event
model and would use this information to make predictions. Separate error processing
mechanisms would monitor these predictions and when errors are signaled from any of these
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error processing mechanisms, people would experience a subjective event boundary and the
unified event model would update to capture the changes in the environment. The process would
then repeat until the next error signal causes the event model to update again. For example, if
visual information were changing rapidly, predictions about future visual information would
likely be incorrect. This would cause the event model to update to better represent the new state
of the visual information. Once the new information is integrated into the event model, relevant
information from the event model would be used by all of the brain systems to continue making
predictions. If there were changes in multiple modalities at the same time, people would still
experience a single event boundary, but the event model would be updated to capture the
changed information from all of the relevant modalities. Figure 16 provides a potential
representation of such a model of event comprehension and prediction.
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Figure 16. Suggested model of Event Segmentation Theory if individual differences are driven
by modality-specific prediction mechanisms. In this case, error signals from any of the
modalities would lead to the perception of a subjective event boundary and would reset a unified
event model. Information from the unified event model would then be used by separate
perceptual processing systems specific to each modality to make new predictions. Only the
visual and auditory systems are represented here for the sake of simplicity, but there are likely
many more separate systems that are involved in making predictions.

4.5. Limitations of the Current Study
There are some limitations of the current study that are important in interpreting the results.
First, the reliability of most of the tasks included in the current study was relatively high, except
for the split-half reliability of the visual world task (r = 0.53), the Letter Sets task (r = 0.44) and
the Paper Folding task (r = 0.67). There is therefore some chance that the low reliability of these
tasks prevented them from correlating with the other tasks included in the current study.
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However, other methods of scoring the visual world task resulted in even lower split-half
reliability scores. Specifically, when growth curves for looking time were calculated separately
for predictive and unpredictive trials, and the slopes from the unpredictive trials were subtracted
from the slopes for the predictive trials to obtain a difference score, the split half reliability was
0.16. Similarly, when the cumulative looking time on unpredictive trials was subtracted from the
cumulative looking time on predictive trials to obtain a difference score, the split-half reliability
was 0.18. One potential explanation for the low split-half reliability is the relatively small
number of trials participants completed during this task; participants only completed 24
experimental trials in this task, half of which were unpredictive sentences and half of which were
predictive sentences. This means that for the split-half reliability testing, each half of the data
only included six trials of each type. Therefore, the split-half reliability found in this study may
not replicate in other studies, and a study with a larger number of trials would be necessary to
determine the actual reliability of this task. Nevertheless, it is unlikely that higher reliability of
the visual world task would have dramatically changed the results of the current study. None of
the other prediction tasks were correlated with one another, and the correlations between
performance on the visual world task and the other prediction tasks were so low that even if a
portion of the signal from the visual world task were correlated with performance on the other
tasks, it still is unlikely that the noise masked more than a small correlation among the tasks.
Similarly, the low split-half reliability for the Letter Sets and Paper Folding tasks was likely due,
in part, to the small number of trials in each task. A study using larger numbers of items for each
of these tasks would be necessary to determine whether the low split-half reliability is an
intrinsic feature of these tasks. However, it is unlikely that the low split-half reliabilities of the
Letter Sets task and the Paper Folding task dramatically affected the results of the current study.
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All three of the fluid intelligence tasks loaded strongly on a fluid intelligence latent factor,
meaning that the fluid intelligence latent factor likely captured the signal present in all of the
tasks without being significantly affected by the noise in the tasks.
In addition, although I examined the relationships between PTSD severity and performance
on the prediction tasks in the study, there were few participants with high scores on the PTSD
scale. This lack of variability may have obscured the true relationships between PTSD severity
and prediction performance. As mentioned above, Eisenberg, Zacks, and Flores (in prep)
examined performance on the PLAT in a clinical sample of people diagnosed with PTSD and
found that people with PTSD performed more poorly on the task than control participants
without PTSD. However, no relationship between PTSD severity and performance on the PLAT
was found in the current study. Similarly, previous studies have found relationships between
PTSD and performance on tasks of general cognitive functioning (e.g., Vasterling et al., 2002;
Bremner, Vermetten, Afzal, & Vythilingam, 2004), whereas there were no significant
relationships between PTSD severity and crystallized or fluid intelligence in the current study;
however, the previous studies included more participants with clinical levels of PTSD.
Therefore, additional research examining the relationship between PTSD severity and
performance on various types of prediction tasks is necessary to determine whether PTSD
impacts performance on prediction tasks other than the PLAT.
Furthermore, as discussed earlier, it is possible that the low correlations among the
prediction tasks could have been due to differences in methods across the tasks, as the tasks all
required different abilities in addition to prediction. One potential method for controlling for
potential individual difference in abilities other than prediction would be to test participants’
performance on tasks that require each of the non-prediction abilities and then control for these
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individual differences in the final analyses. For example, participants could complete tasks that
are relatively pure measures of spatial ability, risk processing, language processing, and motor
planning, and scores on these measures could then be entered as covariates in analyses of the
correlations among the prediction tasks.
In addition to potentially requiring different abilities, the tasks also differed in the directions
given to participants for each task. For example, for both the weather prediction and the Iowa
gambling tasks, the directions to participants were very explicit and explained the true nature of
the task: Participants were told to make predictions about whether there would be rain or sun in
the weather prediction task, and participants were told to choose decks in a way that made them
the most money in the Iowa gambling task. On the other hand, for both the PLAT and the visual
world task, the directions did not explain the ultimate goal for the task: For the PLAT,
participants were simply told to pay attention to the movie, and for the visual world task,
participants were told to respond based on whether the sentence that they heard applied to any of
the images on the screen, without any reference to the predictive nature of the task. It is possible
that if participants had been told to actively make predictions during all of the tasks, that
performance across the tasks would have been more similar. On the other hand, it is highly likely
that people make predictions during everyday life without realizing that they are doing so, and it
is therefore likely that people made predictions while they performed the visual world task and
the PLAT as well. In addition, the pairs of tasks that used similar directions were not correlated
with one another, again suggesting that differences in directions across the tasks cannot explain
the low correlations among the tasks.
Another source of difference across the tasks is how performance was measured for the four
tasks. Performance on the weather prediction and Iowa gambling tasks was measured using the
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accuracy of responses, whereas performance on the PLAT and the weather prediction task was
measured using oculometric data. Accuracy data only provides a measure of the final decision a
participant makes about a particular item, whereas eye tracking data can be much more sensitive,
providing information throughout the decision making process. It is possible that if eye tracking
data had been collected while participants performed the weather prediction and Iowa gambling
tasks, the increased sensitivity would have allowed correlations among the tasks to emerge.
In addition, especially for the Iowa gambling task, an accuracy measure may not have been
the best choice for examining individual differences on this task. While individual variation
certainly existed within the data set, many previous studies using this task used measures of skin
conductance to determine how well participants had learned the task and when they began
making predictions based on their knowledge. For example, Bechara, Damasio, Tranel, &
Damasio (1997) identified a hunch period, in which participants were unable to report that they
knew some decks were bad, but experienced an increased skin conductance response when
choosing from the bad decks. Predictions during this hunch period might more closely resemble
the predictions made in the PLAT and visual world task. Although skin conductance responses
have not typically been used in the weather prediction task, a similar effect might exist in which
participants experience an increased skin conductance response when making an incorrect
choice, while still experiencing the feeling of guessing on the trial. If eye tracking were
combined with skin conductance measures, it might be possible to use the time spent looking at
the correct choice during the hunch phase as a measure of prediction performance on the task,
and that measure might correlate more strongly with performance on the PLAT and the visual
world task. However, if the measurement modality were the driver of the lack of correlations
among the four tasks, one would expect that the tasks with more similar measurement modalities
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would be most highly correlated with one another, which was not the case; all of the tasks had
very low correlations with one another, and most of the correlations among the pairs of tasks
with the same measurement modalities were actually slightly lower than the correlations among
pairs of tasks with different measurement modalities. Therefore, measurement modality is
unlikely to have been the only reason performance on these tasks was uncorrelated.
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Chapter 5: Conclusion
In this study, performance on four different types of prediction tasks was uncorrelated,
providing evidence against a single higher-order prediction mechanism. While the results of this
study suggest that existing theories about prediction require some alteration, particularly the
predictive coding theory (Friston, 2005) and Event Segmentation Theory (Zacks et al., 2007), the
results are not directly in opposition with these theories. The predictive coding theory does not
necessitate a unified prediction mechanism, though such a mechanism was proposed due to the
similar anatomical structure of many systems in the brain (Adams, Friston, & Bastosm 2015). In
fact, the results of this study are in accord with the hierarchical predictive brain proposed by
Friston (2005), with systems that process information from each modality sending predictive
signals from higher order areas to lower order areas and vice versa. In addition, the results of this
study certainly do not provide evidence against the whole of Event Segmentation Theory, but
rather suggest that certain elements of the theory need revision. Overall, instead of an
integratory prediction mechanism, it appears most likely that predictions are formed and acted
upon separately within each sensory modality and that the resulting behavior creates an illusion
of integration. This may be represented in the brain by the activation of separate but overlapping
brain regions that, when activated at the same time by different components of a task, creates the
appearance of an integratory prediction mechanism. Finally, these results can also inform future
studies on prediction, including those investigating prediction ability in psychopathology:
Attempting to generalize from performance on one type of prediction task to another will likely
result in only erroneous predictions.

87

References
Adams, R. A., Friston, K. J., & Bastos, A. M. (2015). Active inference, predictive coding, and
cortical architecture. In Casanova, M. F. & Opris, I. (Eds.), Recent Advances on the
Modular Organization of the Cortex (pp. 97–121). Netherlands: Springer. doi:10.1007/97894-017-9900-3
Apicella, P., Scarnati, E., Ljungberg, T., & Schultz, W. (1992). Neuronal activity in monkey
striatum related to the expectation of predictable environmental events. Journal of
Neurophysiology, 68, 945–960. doi:1432059
Aron, A. R., Shohamy, D., Clark, J., Myers, C., Gluck, M. A., & Poldrack, R. A. (2004). Human
midbrain sensitivity to cognitive feedback and uncertainty during classification learning.
Journal of Neurophysiology, 92, 1144–1152. doi:10.1152/jn.01209.2003
Altmann, G. T. M., & Kamide, Y. (1999). Incremental interpretation at verbs: Restricting the
domain of subsequent reference. Cognition, 73, 247–264. doi:10.1016/S00100277(99)00059-1
Altmann, G. T. M., & Kamide, Y. (2007). The real-time mediation of visual attention by
language and world knowledge: Linking anticipatory (and other) eye movements to
linguistic processing. Journal of Memory and Language, 57, 502–518.
doi:10.1016/j.jml.2006.12.004
Baddeley, A. (2012). Working memory: Theories, models, and controversies. Annual Review of
Psychology, 63, 1–29. doi:10.1146/annurev-psych-120710-100422

88

Bailey, H. R. & Zacks, J. M. (2015). Situation model updating in young and older adults: Global
versus incremental mechanisms. Psychology and Aging, 30, 232-244. doi:
http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/a0039081
Barch, D. M., Braver, T. S., Akbudak, E., Conturo, T., Ollinger, J., & Snyder, A. (2001).
Anterior cingulate cortex and response conflict: Effects of response modality and
processing domain. Cerebral Cortex, 11, 837–848. doi:10.1093/cercor/11.9.837
Bors, D. A., & Forrin, B. (1995). Age, speed of information processing, recall, and fluid
intelligence. Intelligence, 20(3), 229–248. http://doi.org/10.1016/0160-2896(95)90009-8
Botvinick, M. M., Cohen, J. D., & Carter, C. S. (2004). Conflict monitoring and anterior
cingulate cortex: An update. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 8, 539–546.
doi:10.1016/j.tics.2004.10.003
Brand, M., Recknor, E. C., Grabenhorst, F., & Bechara, A. (2007). Decisions under ambiguity
and decisions under risk: Correlations with executive functions and comparisons of two
different gambling tasks with implicit and explicit rules. Journal of Clinical and
Experimental Neuropsychology, 29(1), 86–99. http://doi.org/10.1080/13803390500507196
Brown, J. W., & Braver, T. S. (2005). Learned predictions of error likelihood in the anterior
cingulate cortex. Science, 307, 1118–1121. doi:10.1126/science.1105783
Bates, D., Maechler, M., Bolker, B., & Walker, S. (2015). Fitting Linear Mixed-Effects Models
Using lme4. Journal of Statistical Software, 67(1), 1-48. doi:10.18637/jss.v067.i01
Bechara, A., Dolan, S., Denburg, N., Hindes, A., Anderson, S. W., & Nathan, P. E. (2001).
Decision-making deficits, linked to a dysfunctional ventromedial prefrontal cortex, revealed
in alcohol and stimulant abusers. Neuropsychologia, 39(4), 376–389.
http://doi.org/10.1016/S0028-3932(00)00136-6

89

Bendixen, A., SanMiguel, I., & Schröger, E. (2012). Early electrophysiological indicators for
predictive processing in audition: A review. International Journal of Psychophysiology, 83,
120–131. doi:10.1016/j.ijpsycho.2011.08.003
Bledowski, C., Prvulovic, D., Goebel, R., Zanella, F. E., & Linden, D. E. J. (2004). Attentional
systems in target and distractor processing: A combined ERP and fMRI study. NeuroImage,
22(2), 530–540. doi:10.1016/j.neuroimage.2003.12.034
Bledowski, C., Prvulovic, D., Hoechstetter, K., Scherg, M., Wibral, M., Goebel, R., & Linden,
D. E. J. (2004). Localizing P300 generators in visual target and distractor processing: A
combined event-related potential and functional magnetic resonance imaging study. The
Journal of Neuroscience, 24, 9353–9360. doi:10.1523/JNEUROSCI.1897-04.2004
Blevins, C. A., Weathers, F. W., Davis, M. T., Witte, T. K., & Domino, J. L. (2015). The
Posttraumatic Stress Disorder Checklist for DSM-5 (PCL-5): Development and initial
psychometric evaluation. Journal of Traumatic Stress, 28, 489-498. doi: 10.1002/jts.22059
Bremner, J. D., Vermetten, E., Afzal, N., & Vythilingam, M. (2004). Deficits in verbal
declarative memory function in women with childhood sexual abuse-related Posttraumatic
Stress Disorder. The Journal of Nervous and Mental Disease, 192, 643–649.
doi:10.1097/01.nmd.0000142027.52893.c8
Brouwer, H., & Hoeks, J. C. J. (2013). A time and place for language comprehension: Mapping
the N400 and the P600 to a minimal cortical network. Frontiers in Human Neuroscience, 7,
1-12. doi:10.3389/fnhum.2013.00758
Calamia, M., Markon, K., & Tranel, D. (2013). The robust reliability of neuropsychological
measures: meta-analyses of test-retest correlations. The Clinical Neuropsychologist, 27,
1077–1105. http://doi.org/10.1080/13854046.2013.809795

90

Cannon, E. N., & Woodward, A. L. (2012). Infants generate goal-based action predictions.
Developmental Science, 15, 292–298. doi:10.1111/j.1467-7687.2011.01127.x
Caramazza, A., Anzellotti, S., Strnad, L., & Lingnau, A. (2014). Embodied cognition and mirror
neurons: A critical assessment. Neuroscience, 37, 1–15. http://doi.org/10.1146/annurevneuro-071013-013950
Chen, J., Hale, S. & Myerson, J. (2007). Predicting the size of individual and group differences
on speeded cognitive tasks. Psychonomic Bulletin and Review, 14, 534–541.
Coulson, S., King, J. W., & Kutas, M. (1998). Expect the unexpected: Event-related brain
response to morphosyntactic violations. Language and Cognitive Processes, 13, 21–58.
doi:10.1080/016909698386582
Curiel, J. M., & Radvansky, G. a. (2014). Spatial and character situation model updating.
Journal of Cognitive Psychology, 26(2), 205–212.
http://doi.org/10.1080/20445911.2013.879590
Czigler, I., Balázs, L., & Pató, L. G. (2004). Visual change detection: Event-related potentials are
dependent on stimulus location in humans. Neuroscience Letters, 364, 149–153.
doi:10.1016/j.neulet.2004.04.048
Daneman, M., & Carpenter, P. A. (1980). Individual differences in working memory and
reading. Journal of Verbal Learning and Verbal Behavior, 19, 450–466.
Dehaene, S., Posner, M. I., & Tucker, D. M. (1994). Localization of a Neural System for Error
Detection and Compensation. Psychological Science, 5, 303–305. doi:10.1111/j.14679280.1994.tb00630.x

91

Demaree, H. A., Burns, K. J., & DeDonno, M. A. (2010). Intelligence, but not emotional
intelligence, predicts Iowa Gambling Task performance. Intelligence, 38(2), 249–254.
http://doi.org/10.1016/j.intell.2009.12.004
Dikker, S., & Pylkkänen, L. (2013). Predicting language: MEG evidence for lexical
preactivation. Brain and Language, 127, 55–64. doi:10.1016/j.bandl.2012.08.004
Dronkers, N. F., Wilkins, D. P., Van Valin, R. D., Redfern, B. B., & Jaeger, J. J. (2004). Lesion
analysis of the brain areas involved in language comprehension. Cognition, 92, 145–177.
doi:10.1016/j.cognition.2003.11.002
Ehlers, A., & Clark, D. (2000). A cognitive model of posttraumatic stress disorder. Behaviour
Research and Therapy, 38, 319–345. doi:10.1016/S0005-7967(99)00123-0
Eisenberg, M. L., Zacks, J. M., & Flores, S. Predictive Looking During Viewing of Naturalistic
Activity. Manuscript in preparation, Department of Psychology, Washington University
in St. Louis, St. Louis, MO.
Eisenberg, M. L., Zacks, J. M., Rodebaugh, T. L., & Flores, S. Prediction of Future Activity
Impaired in Posttraumatic Stress Disorder. Manuscript in preparation, Department of
Psychology, Washington University in St. Louis, St. Louis, MO.
Ekstrom, R. B., French, J.W., Harman, H. H., & Dermen, D. (1976). Kit of Factor-Referenced
Cognitive Tests. Educational Testing Service. Princeton, New Jersey.
Elsner, C., Falck-Ytter, T., & Gredebäck, G. (2012). Humans anticipate the goal of other
people’s point-light actions. Frontiers in Psychology, 3, 1–7. doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2012.00120
Ernst, M., Nelson, E. E., McClure, E. B., Monk, C. S., Munson, S., Eshel, N., … Pine, D. S.
(2004). Choice selection and reward anticipation: An fMRI study. Neuropsychologia, 42,
1585–1597. doi:10.1016/j.neuropsychologia.2004.05.011

92

Falck-Ytter, T., Gredebäck, G., & von Hofsten, C. (2006). Infants predict other people’s action
goals. Nature Neuroscience, 9, 878–879. doi:10.1038/nn1729
Falconer, E., Bryant, R., Felmingham, K. L., Kemp, A. H., Gordon, E., Peduto, A., … Williams,
L. M. (2008). The neural networks of inhibitory control in posttraumatic stress disorder.
Journal of Psychiatry & Neuroscience, 33, 413–22. Retrieved from
http://www.pubmedcentral.nih.gov/articlerender.fcgi?artid=2527717&tool=pmcentrez&ren
dertype=abstract
Falkenstein, M., Hohnsbein, J., Hoormann, J., & Blanke, L. (1991). Effects of crossmodal
divided attention on late ERP components. II. Error processing in choice reaction tasks.
Electroencephalography and Clinical Neurophysiology, 78, 447–455. doi:10.1016/00134694(91)90062-9
Flanagan, J. R., & Johansson, R. S. (2003). Action plans used in action observation. Nature, 424,
769–771. doi:10.1038/nature01861
Friston, K. (2005). A theory of cortical responses. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal
Society of London. Series B, Biological Sciences, 360, 815–836. doi:10.1098/rstb.2005.1622
Fruchter, J., Linzen, T., Westerlund, M., & Marantz, A. (2015). Lexical Preactivation in Basic
Linguistic Phrases. Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience, 1–24. doi:10.1162/jocn
Gehring, W. J., Goss, B., Coles, M. G. H., Meyer, D. E., & Donchin, E. (1993). A neural system
for error detection and compensation. Psychological Science, 4, 385–390.
doi:10.1111/j.1467-9280.1993.tb00586.x
Gluck, M. A., Shohamy, D., & Myers, C. (2002). How do people solve the “weather prediction”
task?: Individual variability in strategies for probabilistic category learning. Learning &
Memory, 9, 408–418. doi:10.1101/lm.45202

93

Gonzalez, R., Wardle, M., Jacobus, J., Vassileva, J., & Martin-Thormeyer, E. M. (2010).
Influence of procedural learning on Iowa Gambling Task performance among HIV+
individuals with history of substance dependence. Archives of Clinical Neuropsychology,
25(1), 28–38. http://doi.org/10.1093/arclin/acp094
Haenschel, C., Vernon, D. J., Dwivedi, P., Gruzelier, J. H., & Baldeweg, T. (2005). Eventrelated brain potential correlates of human auditory sensory memory-trace formation. The
Journal of Neuroscience, 25, 10494–10501. doi:10.1523/JNEUROSCI.1227-05.2005
Hayhoe, M. M., Shrivastava, A., Mruczek, R., & Pelz, J. B. (2003). Visual memory and motor
planning in a natural task. Journal of Vision, 3, 49–63. doi:10.1167/3.1.6
Hikosaka, O., Sakamoto, M., & Usui, S. (1989). Functional properties of monkey caudate
neurons. III. Activities related to expectation of target and reward. Journal of
Neurophysiology, 61(4), 814–832.
Holroyd, C. B., Nieuwenhuis, S., Yeung, N., & Cohen, J. D. (2003). Errors in reward prediction
are reflected in the event-related brain potential. Neuroreport, 14(18), 2481–2484.
http://doi.org/10.1097/01.wnr.0000099601.41403.a5
Hu, L., & Bentler, P. M. (1999). Cutoff criteria for fit indexes in covariance structure analysis:
Conventional criteria versus new alternatives. Structural Equation Modeling: A
Multidisciplinary Journal, 6, 1–55. doi:10.1080/10705519909540118
Herzog, W., Boomsma, A., & Reinecke, S. (2007). The model-size effect on traditional and
modified tests of covariance structures. Structural Equation Modeling: A Multidisciplinary
Journal, 14, 361–390. doi:10.1080/10705510701301602

94

Hikosaka, O., Sakamoto, M., & Usui, S. (1989). Functional properties of monkey caudate
neurons. III. Activities related to expectation of target and reward. Journal of
Neurophysiology, 61, 814–832.
Huettel, S. A, Song, A. W., & McCarthy, G. (2005). Decisions under uncertainty: Probabilistic
context influences activation of prefrontal and parietal cortices. The Journal of
Neuroscience, 25, 3304–3311. doi:10.1523/JNEUROSCI.5070-04.2005
Hunnius, S., & Bekkering, H. (2010). The early development of object knowledge: A study of
infants’ visual anticipations during action observation. Developmental Psychology, 46, 446–
454. doi:10.1037/a0016543
Johansson, R. S., Westling, G., Bäckström, A, & Flanagan, J. R. (2001). Eye-hand coordination
in object manipulation. The Journal of Neuroscience, 21, 6917–6932.
Kamide, Y., Altmann, G. T. M., & Haywood, S. L. (2003). The time-course of prediction in
incremental sentence processing: Evidence from anticipatory eye movements. Journal of
Memory and Language, 49, 133–156. doi:10.1016/S0749-596X(03)00023-8
Kane, M. J., Hambrick, D. Z., Tuholski, S. W., Wilhelm, O., Payne, T. W., & Engle, R. W.
(2004). The Generality of Working Memory Capacity: A Latent-Variable Approach to
Verbal and Visuospatial Memory Span and Reasoning. Journal of Experimental
Psychology: General, 133, 189–217. doi:10.1037/0096-3445.133.2.189
Knowlton, B. J., Squire, L. R., & Gluck, M. A. (1994). Probabilistic classification learning in
amnesia. Learning & Memory, 1, 106–120. doi:10.1101/lm.1.2.106
Kok, P., Jehee, J. F. M., & de Lange, F. P. (2012). Less Is More: Expectation Sharpens
Representations in the Primary Visual Cortex. Neuron, 75(2), 265–270.
http://doi.org/10.1016/j.neuron.2012.04.034

95

Kujala, T., Tervaniemi, M., & Schröger, E. (2007). The mismatch negativity in cognitive and
clinical neuroscience: Theoretical and methodological considerations. Biological
Psychology, 74, 1–19. doi:10.1016/j.biopsycho.2006.06.001
Kutas, M., & Federmeier, K. D. (2011). Thirty years and counting: Finding meaning in the N400
component of the event related brain potential (ERP). Annual Review of Psychology, 62,
621–647. doi:10.1146/annurev.psych.093008.131123
Kutas, M., & Hillyard, S. A. (1980). Reading senseless sentences: Brain potentials reflect
semantic incongruity. Science, 207, 203–205. doi:10.1126/science.7350657
Land, M., Mennie, N., & Rusted, J. (1999). The roles of vision and eye movements in the control
of activities of daily living. Perception, 28, 1311–1328. doi:10.1068/p2935
Linnman, C., Zeffiro, T. A, Pitman, R. K., & Milad, M. R. (2011). An fMRI study of
unconditioned responses in post-traumatic stress disorder. Biology of Mood & Anxiety
Disorders, 1(8), 1–12. doi:10.1186/2045-5380-1-8
Liu, X., Hairston, J., Schrier, M., & Fan, J. (2011). Common and distinct networks underlying
reward valence and processing stages: A meta-analysis of functional neuroimaging studies.
Neuroscience and Biobehavioral Reviews, 35, 1219–1236.
doi:10.1016/j.neubiorev.2010.12.012
Luft, C. D. B., Meeson, A., Welchman, A. E., & Kourtzi, Z. (2015). Decoding the future from
past experience: learning shapes predictions in early visual cortex. Journal of
Neurophysiology, 113(9), 3159–71. http://doi.org/10.1152/jn.00753.2014
MacLeod, C. M., & MacLeod, C. M. (1991). Half a century of research on the Stroop effect: An
integrative review. Psychological Bulletin, 109, 163–203. doi:10.1037/0033-2909.109.2.163

96

Mitchell, R. L. C. (2005). The BOLD response during Stroop task-like inhibition paradigms:
Effects of task difficulty and task-relevant modality. Brain and Cognition, 59, 23–37.
doi:10.1016/j.bandc.2005.04.001
Monterosso, J., Ehrman, R., Napier, K. L., O’Brien, C. P., & Childress, A. R. (2001). Three
decision-making tasks in cocaine-dependent patients: Do they measure the same construct?
Addiction, 96(12), 1825–1837. http://doi.org/10.1046/j.1360-0443.2001.9612182512.x
Mustovic, H., Scheffler, K., Di Salle, F., Esposito, F., Neuhoff, J. G., Hennig, J., & Seifritz, E.
(2003). Temporal integration of sequential auditory events: Silent period in sound pattern
activates human planum temporale. NeuroImage, 20, 429–434. doi:10.1016/S10538119(03)00293-3
National Center for Posttraumatic Stress Disorder. (n.d.) PTSD Checklist for DSM-5 (PCL-5).
Retrieved July 2, 2016, from http://www.ptsd.va.gov/professional/assessment/adult-sr/ptsdchecklist.asp
Osterhout, L., & Holcomb, P. J. (1993). Event-related brain potentials elicited by syntactic
anomaly. Journal of Memory and Language, 31, 785–806.
Osterhout, L., & Nicol, J. (1999). On the distinctiveness, independence, and time course of the
brain responses to syntactic and semantic anomalies. Language and Cognitive Processes,
14, 283–317. doi:10.1080/016909699386310
Oswald, F. L., McAbee, S. T., Redick, T. S., & Hambrick, D. Z. (2014). The development of a
short domain-general measure of working memory capacity. Behavior Research Methods.
1-13. doi:10.3758/s13428-014-0543-2
Paavilainen, P., Arajärvi, P., & Takegata, R. (2007). Preattentive detection of nonsalient
contingencies between auditory features. Neuroreport, 18, 159-163.

97

Paul, S. M. (1985). The Advanced Raven’s Progressive Matrices: Normative data for an
American university population and an examination of Spearman’s g. Journal of
Experimental Education, 54, 95–100. http://doi.org/10.1080/00220973.1986.10806404
Polich, J. (2007). Updating P300: An integrative theory of P3a and P3b. Clinical
Neurophysiology, 118, 2128–48. doi:10.1016/j.clinph.2007.04.019
Polich (2012). Neuropsychology of P300. In Luck, S. J. & Kappenman, E. S. (Eds.), The Oxford
handbook of event-related potential components (159-188). New York, NY: Oxford
University Press.
Polich, J., & Margala, C. (1997). P300 and probability: Comparison of oddball and singlestimulus paradigms. International Journal of Psychophysiology, 25, 169–176.
doi:10.1016/S0167-8760(96)00742-8
Radvansky, G. A., Tamplin, A. K., & Krawietz, S. A. (2010). Walking through doorways causes
forgetting: Environmental integration. Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 17(6), 900–904.
http://doi.org/10.3758/PBR.17.6.900
Ramnani, N., Elliott, R., Athwal, B. S., & Passingham, R. E. (2004). Prediction error for free
monetary reward in the human prefrontal cortex. NeuroImage, 23, 777–786.
doi:10.1016/j.neuroimage.2004.07.028
Raij, T., McEvoy, L., Mäkelä, J. P., & Hari, R. (1997). Human auditory cortex is activated by
omissions of auditory stimuli. Brain Research, 745, 134–143. doi:10.1016/S01678760(97)85548-1
Rao, R. P., & Ballard, D. H. (1999). Predictive coding in the visual cortex: a functional
interpretation of some extra-classical receptive-field effects. Nature Neuroscience, 2, 79–
87. http://doi.org/10.1038/4580

98

Raven, J. C. (1990) Advanced Progressive Matrices: Sets I, II. Oxford Univ Press, Oxford.
Redick, T. S., Broadway, J. M., Meier, M. E., Kuriakose, P. S., Unsworth, N., Kane, M. J., &
Engle, R. W. (2012). Measuring working memory capacity with automated complex span
tasks. European Journal of Psychological Assessment, 28, 164–171. doi:10.1027/10155759/a000123
Rinne, T., Alho, K., Ilmoniemi, R. J., Virtanen, J., & Näätänen, R. (2000). Separate time
behaviors of the temporal and frontal mismatch negativity sources. NeuroImage, 12, 14–19.
doi:10.1006/nimg.2000.0591
Salthouse, T. (1993). Speed and knowledge as determinants of adult age differences in verbal
tasks. Journal of Gerontology: Psychological Sciences, 48, P29–36.
Salthouse, T. A. (2001). Structural models of the relations between age and measures of
cognitive functioning. Intelligence, 29(2), 93–115. http://doi.org/10.1016/S01602896(00)00040-4
Salthouse, T. & Babcock, R. (1991). Decomposing adult age differences in working memory.
Developmental Psychology, 27, 763–777.
Schultz, W., Tremblay, L., & Hollerman, J. R. (1998). Reward prediction in primate basal
ganglia and frontal cortex. Neuropharmacology, 37, 421–429. Retrieved from
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/9704983
Service, E., Helenius, P., Maury, S., & Salmelin, R. (2007). Localization of syntactic and
semantic brain responses using magnetoencephalography. Journal of Cognitive
Neuroscience, 19, 1193–1205. doi:10.1162/jocn.2007.19.7.1193

99

Shah, P., & Miyake, A. (1996). The separability of working memory resources for spatial
thinking and language processing: An individual differences approach. Journal of
Experimental Psychology: General, 125, 4–27.
Shin, L. M., & Liberzon, I. (2010). The neurocircuitry of fear, stress, and anxiety disorders.
Neuropsychopharmacology, 35, 169–91. doi:10.1038/npp.2009.83
Shohamy, D., Myers, C. E., Grossman, S., Sage, J., Gluck, M. A., & Poldrack, R. A. (2004).
Cortico-striatal contributions to feedback-based learning: Converging data from
neuroimaging and neuropsychology. Brain, 127, 851–859. doi:10.1093/brain/awh100
Stam, R. (2007). PTSD and stress sensitisation: A tale of brain and body Part 1: Human studies.
Neuroscience and Biobehavioral Reviews, 31, 530–57.
doi:10.1016/j.neubiorev.2006.11.010
Swaab, T. Y., Ledoux, K, Camblin, C. C., & Boudewyn (2012). Language-related ERP
components. In Luck, S. J. & Kappenman, E. S. (Eds.), The Oxford handbook of eventrelated potential components (397-439). New York, NY: Oxford University Press.
Swallow, K. M., Barch, D. M., Head, D., Maley, C. J., Holder, D., & Zacks, J. M. (2011).
Changes in events alter how people remember recent information. Journal of Cognitive
Neuroscience, 23(5), 1052–64. http://doi.org/10.1162/jocn.2010.21524
Tales, A., Newton, P., Troscianko, T., & Butler, S. (1999). Mismatch negativity in the visual
modality. Neuroreport, 10, 3363–3367.
Tanaka, S. C., Doya, K., Okada, G., Ueda, K., Okamoto, Y., & Yamawaki, S. (2004). Prediction
of immediate and future rewards differentially recruits cortico-basal ganglia loops. Nature
Neuroscience, 7, 887–893. doi:10.1038/nn1279

100

Trapp, S., & Bar, M. (2015). Prediction, context, and competition in visual recognition. Annals
of the New York Academy of Sciences, 1339, 190–198. doi:10.1111/nyas.12680
Tse, C.-S., Balota, D. A., Yap, M. J., Duchek, J. M. & McCabe, D. P. (2010). Effects of healthy
aging and early stage dementia of the Alzheimer’s type on components of response time
distributions in three attention tasks. Neuropsychology, 24, 300–315.
Turner, M. L. & Engle, R. W. (1989). Is working memory capacity task dependent? Journal of
Memory & Language, 28, 127–154.
Ullsperger, M., & von Cramon, D. Y. (2001). Subprocesses of performance monitoring: A
dissociation of error processing and response competition revealed by event-related fMRI
and ERPs. NeuroImage, 14, 1387–1401. doi:10.1006/nimg.2001.0935
van Berkum, J. J. A., Brown, C. M., & Hagoort, P. (1999). Early referential context effects in
sentence processing: Evidence from event-related brain potentials. Journal of Memory and
Language, 41, 147–182. doi:10.1006/jmla.1999.2641
van Berkum, J. J. A, Brown, C. M., Zwitserlood, P., Kooijman, V., & Hagoort, P. (2005).
Anticipating upcoming words in discourse: Evidence from ERPs and reading times. Journal
of Experimental Psychology. Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 31, 443–467.
doi:10.1037/0278-7393.31.3.443
van Wingen, G., Geuze, E., Caan, M. W. A., Kozicz, T., Olabarriaga, S. D., Denys, D., …
Fernández, G. (2012). Persistent and reversible consequences of combat stress on the
mesofrontal circuit and cognition. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 109,
15508–15513. doi:10.1073/pnas.1206330109//DCSupplemental.www.pnas.org/cgi/doi/10.1073/pnas.1206330109

101

Vasterling, J. J., Brailey, K., Constans, J. I., & Sutker, P. B. (1998). Attention and memory
dysfunction in posttraumatic stress disorder. Neuropsychology, 12, 125–133.
doi:10.1037//0894-4105.12.1.125
Vasterling, J. J., Duke, L. M., Brailey, K., Constans, J. I., Allain, A. N., & Sutker, P. B. (2002).
Attention, learning, and memory performances and intellectual resources in Vietnam
veterans: PTSD and no disorder comparisons. Neuropsychology, 16, 5–14.
doi:10.1037//0894-4105.16.1.5
Wasserman, J. I., Barry, R. J., Bradford, L., Delva, N. J., & Beninger, R. J. (2012). Probabilistic
classification and gambling in patients with schizophrenia receiving medication:
Comparison of risperidone, olanzapine, clozapine and typical antipsychotics.
Psychopharmacology, 222(1), 173–183. http://doi.org/10.1007/s00213-011-2634-4
Weathers, F.W., Blake, D.D., Schnurr, P.P., Kaloupek, D.G., Marx, B.P., & Keane, T.M. (2013).
The Life Events Checklist for DSM-5 (LEC-5). Instrument available from the National
Center for PTSD at www.ptsd.va.gov
Weathers, F.W., Litz, B.T., Keane, T.M., Palmieri, P.A., Marx, B.P., & Schnurr, P.P. (2013).
The PTSD Checklist for DSM-5 (PCL-5). Scale available from the National Center for
PTSD at www.ptsd.va.gov.
Wechsler, D. (2008). Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale—Fourth Edition. San Antonio, TX:
Pearson Assessment.
Wei, J. H., Chan, T. C., & Luo, Y. J. (2002). A modified oddball paradigm “cross-modal delayed
response” and the research on mismatch negativity. Brain Research Bulletin, 57, 221–230.
doi:10.1016/S0361-9230(01)00742-0

102

Weinberg, A., Dieterich, R., & Riesel, A. (2015). Error-related brain activity in the age of RDoC:
A review of the literature. International Journal of Psychophysiology.
doi:10.1016/j.ijpsycho.2015.02.029
Zacks, J. M. (2004). Using movement and intentions to understand simple events. Cognitive
Science, 28, 979-1008.
Zacks, J. M., Kurby, C. a., Eisenberg, M. L., & Haroutunian, N. (2011). Prediction Error
Associated with the Perceptual Segmentation of Naturalistic Events. Journal of Cognitive
Neuroscience, 23, 4057–4066. http://doi.org/10.1162/jocn_a_00078
Zacks, J. M., Speer, N. K., & Reynolds, J. R. (2009). Segmentation in reading and film
comprehension. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 138, 307-327. doi:
10.1037/a0015305
Zacks, J. M., Speer, N. K., Swallow, K. M., Braver, T. S., & Reynolds, J. R. (2007). Event
perception: A mind-brain perspective. Psychological Bulletin, 133, 273-293. doi:
10.1037/0033-2909.133.2.273
Zacks, J. M., Speer, N. K., Vettel, J. M., & Jacoby, L. L. (2006). Event understanding and
memory in healthy aging and dementia of the Alzheimer type. Psychology and Aging, 21,
466-482. doi: 10.1037/0882-7974.21.3.466

103

